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The three major philosophical

connections between concepts are

analysis, epistemic mark, and general theoretical

thought to relate pleasure to intrinsic goodness.
sists in

a

link.

Each has been

The Introduction con-

brief study of the nature of these connections.

The body of

the thesis examines whether pleasure and intrinsic goodness
are so related.
In

Chapter III the question

is

whether the concept of pleasure en-

ters into an analysis of the concept of being intrinsically good.
topic is approached through writings by Franz Brentano.

It

This

is argued

that no such analysis is possible.

Chapter III is concerned with whether pleasure can help us to
identify the bearers of intrinsic goodness.
work is central

Again, some of Brentano

to the topic, as is work by Charles Baylis.

gued that pleasure is of no special

It

1

s

is ar-

help in discovering the intrinsic

goods.

Chapter

IV

begins with an attempt to give

a

clear and complete

formulation of hedoni sm--the theory according to which only pleasure
intrinsically good.

is

The formulation builds upon the efforts of Warren

TV

.

Quinn and Edward Oldfield.

Then an argument against hedonism
by

Brentano is critically assessed.

C.

D.

Broad's objection to the effect

that the pleasure of malice is not
intrinsically good is then evaluated,
as is G. E. Moore's objection to the
effect that beauty is also intrin-

sically good.

It

is contended that hedonism does
not succumb to any of

these objections.
The Appendix considers whether instrumental

pends upon intrinsic goodness.
not

It

is argued that most familiar sorts do

so depend, but one can be shown to do so by

argument

value of any sort de-

a

kind of First Cause
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Broadly speaking, this dissertation
is

a

search for philosoph-

ically significant ties between
pleasure and intrinsic goodness.

We

consider whether pleasure enters into an
analysis of intrinsic goodness,

whether pleasure can be used in

a

criterion of intrinsic goodness, and

whether pleasure and intrinsic goodness are
co-extensive.
of this introduction is to explain these topics.

The purpose

First, though, we

announce some presuppositions.

Some Presuppositions

A.

Much that has been controverted is taken for granted here.

might as well

I

set out the main assumptions right here at the outset.

assume that there is such

a

I

thing as intrinsic goodness (called by some

philosophers "inherent goodness," and by others "intrinsic desirability").

I

assume that there are intrinsic goods.

particular value theory, but

I

I

do not assume any

do take this much for granted:

Evalua-

tive hedoni sm--very roughly the view that only pleasure is intrinsically
good and only pain is intrinsically bad--is not analytically or criter-

ially false.

That is,

I

assume that it cannot be deduced just from an

analysis or an epistemic criterion of intrinsic goodness and uncontroversial

premises that evaluative hedonism is false.

thing we must have to get anywhere:

criteria.

a

This gives us some-

test for proposed analyses and

And it does so without presupposing the truth, or even the

1

2

possible truth, of any theory of
value.

Given how basic are the dis-

agreements about the existence,
nature and application of intrinsic
goodness, it is good to be able to
travel
see how we might make any important

this lightly.

It

is hard to

progress in this investigation using

only lighter normative baggage.
assume that it does not affect the normative
questions at issue

I

to take state of affairs or events to be
the bearers of intrinsic good-

ness.
rel

I

further assume that it does not hurt to take
pleasure to be

ation--the taking of

state of affairs.

they arise.

In

logical claim.

I

pi

I

person and

a

am not maintaining the truth of the onto-

merely take it that we do proposals about pleasure and

intrinsic goodness no special
way.

a

attempt to answer relevant objections to this as

each case,
I

easure--that can hold between

a

harm by making the topic definite in this

(The reader is encouraged to verify as we go along that the ontol-

ogy makes no difference where it is not defended.)

Finally, it is assumed here that pleasure and pain come in degrees, and numerical

sible

J

comparisons within and between the two are pos-

Outside of philosophy this is often assumed, as when someone

says, "I was pleased when Smith left, but

I

was twice as pleased when

Jones left," or "The pleasure of dining with them balanced off the pain
of waiting for them," or "Disease has caused

misery than famine."

I

a

greater quantity of human

know of no plausible grounds for doubting that

such quantitative relationships exist.

2

All

doubts that make sense

here seem to reduce to doubts about the feasibility of finding out the

relevant amounts.

I

do not assume that that can be done.

3

Of course the above list
does not include everything of
philosophical

substance that is assumed below.

presuppos

i

t

appalling.

But it summarizes the really
big

ions --the ones that some
philosophers would find shocking or

They are fairly forewarned.

B.

The Goals of Philosophical Analysis

We now proceed to examine in some detail

the sorts of connections

between pleasure and intrinsic goodness that are
to be studied here.
First, there is the question whether the
concept of pleasure enters into
an analysis of intrinsic goodness.

What would that entry amount to?

Without trouble, we can work any concept into

a

necessary equivalence

with intrinsic goodness:
Pl.l

p

is

intrinsically good iff

p

is

intrinsically good or

p

is

intrinsically good and either

,

where the blank can be filled in with an expression for any concept, and
a

truth results.

At the other extreme,

it is reasonably clear that the

concept of pleasure is not part of what is meant by "intrinsically good"
in English.

The following example can make that plausible:

raised in an anti-hedonistic sub-culture.

A child is

The child is kept in complete

ignorance on the topic of pleasure, never having any himself and never
getting any evidence about what it is like.

concept of intrinsic goodness, though.

The child is taught the

The examples used are cases of

things taken by the anti-hedonists to be good on their own:
and perseverance in the face of misfortune.
be sought for their own sake.^

It

is insisted

hard work
that these

.

4

Thus we should not expect to find

phrase synonymous with "in-

a

trinsically good" in which the concept
of pleasure is expressed.

And we

can find every number of uninteresting
necessary equivalences involving

pleasure and intrinsic goodness.

But there is something in between
of

considerable importance to philosophers:
inition.

analysis or philosophical def-

What does it take to have one of those?

for

a

full

der

a

recent proposal by Roderick Chisholm. 4

study of analysis.

But

it will

This is not the place

be worth our while to consij 0 understand the

pro-

posed analysis of analysis, first we need:

Dl.l

£

j mpl ies G

df .

=

is necessarily such that,

p

if it obtains,

then something has G.

D1.2

£ involves

q

=

df .

pis

necessarily such that whoever enter-

tains it entertains q.

D1.3

p

involves G

=

df .

p

involves

a

q

which is necessarily such

that it obtains iff something has G, and G is not an all or
nothing property (i.e., possibly, something has G and somethi ng does not)
In

terms of these defined expressions we are given:
D1.4

p

analyzes

q

=

df.

(i)

p

(ii) both p and q imply a

not involve; and
q

(iii)

p

is logically equivalent to q; and

property that

p

involves but

q

does

involves every state of affairs that

involves.

The example:
el

(a)
is a

Something is
brother,

a

male and

a

sibling, analyzes (b) Something

5

can be used to see how D1.4 works.
alent to (b).

Is

there

a

Clearly (a) is necessarily equiv-

property that both require to be
instantiated,

while only (a) requires entertaining
something logically equivalent to
its instantiation?
a

Yes, the property of being

sibling when (b) is true.

a

sibling.

There must be

But we must think of something being
a sib-

ling (or an equivalent) when thinking of
(a), and not (b).

That, at any

rate, is how the example is supposed to work.

However well we judge D1.4 to work in cases like
el, other cases
make it look much too restrictive.

We do not want to set our goal

of an

analytic connection between the concepts of pleasure and
intrinsic goodness so high that it is not met by:
e2

(c)

Something is

side being

a

closed, 3-dimensional

figure with every

square plane segment, analyses (d) Something is

a

think, as lucid, succinct, and illuminating an explanation of

a

a

cube.
E2 is,

I

geometrical concept as we can find.
(d)

Yet (c) does not involve everything

involves, for it does not involve (d).

fact that (c) pertains to cubes.

So that

Many have to figure out the
is not staring them in the

mind's eye when first they entertain (c).

Furthermore, it is manifest

that almost none of the concept analyses, e.g. of knowledge, which are

actually proposed of late include analysans that involve their analysanda.

This lack of involvement is not in fact counted as refutation of

these proposals.

Of course this might be

a

mistake.

But the widespread

sustained interest in these proposals suggests that something weaker

than

a

D1

.4-anal ysi

s

would be significant.

Surely e2 for instance

6

states

a

connection that is more interesting
than non-obvious necessary

equivalence.
e3

Compare e2 with:

There is no negation-complete formal
theory of arithmetic,

analyses (g) Something is yellow or
nothing is yellow.
To explain what some seek from
analyses, construction metaphors

are often employed.

The analysans, it is said, should tell

us

what are

the "building blocks" of the analysandum,
and it should say how the

blocks are "put together."
cessful

But not everything that appears to be

analysis conforms to that metaphor.

e4

(h)

Something is

a

brother or

a

a

suc-

Consider:

sister, analyzes (i) Something

is a sibling.

The construction metaphor would have it that el tells us that
being

sibling is

a

building block of being

a

brother.

a

But e4 seems as satis-

factory an analysis as el, and the metaphor would have it that e4 tells
us that being a brother is

a

building block of beihg

a

sibling

(albeit

one that is "disjunctively joined" to another to make up siblinghood,

while siblinghood is "conjunctively joined" in the composition of brotherhood).

No building can be made out of blocks related as el and e4

would tell us brotherhood and siblinghood are.

If

one part is made out

of two others, neither of the two can be made out of it.
will

Perhaps we

come to be so well justified in accepting some theory of property

composition that we become entitled to reject the "construction" indicated by el or e4.

But that would not solve the problem.

There is

clearly something which would be of philosophical interest (if these

.

7

were philosophically interesting
concepts) that el and e4 do equally
wel

1

There is another sort of problem for
D1.4.
has pointed out 5 that it counts the following
as
e5

(j)

Something is

thing is

a

brother and

a

a

Herbert Heidelberger
a

case of analysis:

sibling, analyzes (k) Some-

brother.

But e5 and any other example where the
expression of the analysans con-

tains the expression of the analysandum is not
least such circularity is

served by analysis.

5

Yet

fatal

e5 and its

identify which concept
its nature.

a

a

a

good analysis.

At

weakness for some purposes to be

ilk cannnot be used to informatively

phrase expresses, or to solve any puzzle about

some aims of analysis are achieved only when the

analysans at least involves the analysandum.

To

show by analysis that

"the average tomato" only appears to refer, the analyzing sentences must

convey the whole meanings of the ones containing putative reference to
an

average tomato.

Otherwise we have not been shown that we can, with-

out such reference, say everything that can be said with it.

more, D1.4 has

a

feature that it is important for

to have--it blocks the paradox of analysis. 7

dox is this:
cal

.

It

a

Further-

notion of analysis

Briefly stated the para-

Some have held that analysans and analysandum are identi-

is therefore found

paradoxical

that analyses are more informa-

tive than what is expressed by an identity statement where the same re-

ferring expression appears twice.

On D1.4's account the analysans

different proposition than the analysandum--one which differs by

is

a

8

asserting something which is
just implied by the latter.

That allows

Dl. 4-analyses to be sufficiently
informative.
I

think it is

a

mistake to look for some one kind of
equiva-

lence— "analysis"— that accomplishes

all

these things.

As

there are many kinds of valuable necessary
equivalences.
kinds fulfill

different philosophical purposes.

goals and say what it takes to achieve them.
has been used by philosophers to cover

tives.

G.

E.

a

I

see it,

Different

We can identify these

The expression "analysis"

variety of philosophical objec-

Moore, the philosopher who did the most to give
it cur-

rency, used the term in several ways.

that his uses of the term share. 8

I

There is nothing at all obvious

see nothing of philosophical

im-

portance that can only be settled when we determine which
equivalences
it is best to call

"analyses."

The sort of ontological

onymy.

To

reduction already mentioned requires syn-

rid ourselves of the need to suppose that

a

term with clear

and definite meaning refers, we must see that its linguistic work can be

done without any phrase that gives evidence of denoting what the former
would denote if it did.

So in the case of this philosophical

is expressed by the reducing

goal, what

and the reduced sentences must enter into

the strongest of equivalence relat ions--identi ty.
best expressed by sentences of the form:

cally misleading way to say B."

This will

Such reduction is

"A is a potentially ontologibe philosophically helpful

when it enables us to see that the truth of A only requires us to
acknowledge the ontology of B, rather than the additional thing(s) that
A suggests.

I

9

Another implication of identity
occurs when mere synonymy is expressed, e.g. with expressions of
the form:
"A means the same as B
can see no philosophical
form, even when A and

aim that is always achieved by truths
of that
are different expressions for
philosophically

B

significant propositions.
concepts.
some).

Many such sentences are useful

That is no philosophical

in conveying

enterprise (though it is part of

There are two sorts of philosophical work
that can be accom-

plished by sentences of that form.

But neither requires identity.

One such task is the elucidation of philosophical

quite difficult to say in general what that is.

concepts.

It

is

This is partly because

different theories of properties and propositions impose quite
different
constraints.

Suuppose

phor is right.

a

theory that appeals to the construction meta-

Then, assuming that, e.g. brotherhood is

complex

a

"structure," it can be fully elucidated by saying what its simple
"parts" are and how they are "put together."

Perhaps el makes these

elements and their relationship obvious.

perhaps (a) in el means

the same as (b).

'Something is

a

Then "'Something is

male and

a

a

And

brother,

sibling'" would be

a

1

means the same as

tolerably clear way to

impart the details of what goes into the concept of being

a

brother.

But even better would be an expression that is explicit about the con-

struction, such as:
e6

(1)

Something falling under the conjunction of the concepts

maleness and siblinghood is identical with (m) something being
a

brother.

10

If e6

is true,

it

not synonymous,

is

informative.

so this

It

is also clear that (1)

and

(m)

are

informativeness should not seem paradoxical.

One way the sentence el could be informative
while (a) means the same as
(b)

is by making

evident by its syntax the "construction" of
brother-

hood, i.e., what e6 tells us explicitly.

the moment, then how is e4 informative?

But
It

if all

that is assumed for

cannot be by displaying the

composition of brotherhood.
Whether some concepts are built out of others or not, plainly
it

illuminates
is,

if we

a

concept to be told inexplicit implications of it.

provide an equivalent that involves

a

That

mere implication of the

concept's application, we show something of what goes along with that
application.

This is

a

service that every

D1

.4-analysi

s

does provide.

And regardless of whether "constructivists" are correct, we are free to

say that that is something that e4 accomplishes (and el too, if Chisholm
is right that (b) does not involve (a)).

larity does not ruin

a

proposal

It

is worth noting that circu-

for this purpose. 9

Note also that

this task does not require that one equivalent have all the involvements
of the other.

That condition of D1.4 (perhaps intended to provide for

reduction by "analysis") should not be imposed on all explanations of
concepts.

I

have no full

One good

account of concept explanation.

question is whether any invol vemental
how to argue that it is, nor see

a

overlap is needed.

I

clear case that lacks it.

event, this work of bringing out implications is fundamental
of concept explanation.

neither see
In

any

to one sort

11

The other philosophical

task that an assertion of

a

meaning iden-

tity may accomplish is what is sometimes
called “clarification," sometimes

explication" of concepts.

expression is said to express
erties or covering just

a

a

That aim usually arises like this:

An

concept having certain remarkable prop-

certain range of cases.

Some philosophers

doubt whether any concept has those features, or
wonder which qualities
are present in just those cases.

By expressing

in

clear terms

a

concept

which undoubtedly has those features or applies in
just the right cases,
the "clarification" or "explication" is accomplished.

done by offering

a

This might be

synonymous expression that uses sufficiently clear

terminology to make the relevant qualities or extension manifest.

But

providing another concept (usually, an equivalent is required) that has
those features would do as well.

I

take that to be what is actually be-

ing attempted in the name of "analyzing knowledge," for example.

even

a

complicated equivalent often can supply

the initial concept.

Also,

better understanding of

a

For the target concept is often the psychological-

ly easiest or most prominent way to conceive of the extension in ques-

tion.

E2 gives an excellent example of how this sort of thing works

(though there is nothing philosophically doubtful or fascinating about

cubicality in the first place.)
in straightforward

(c)

employs basic geometrical concepts

relationships that result in

a

the intuitively simplest concept is that of being

worth pointing out that circularity does spoil
deavor.

E4,

for instance, cannot

whether there is

a

a

condition for which
a

cube.

proposal

perform this task.

Here it is

for this en-

Questions about

concept having certain properties or curiosity about

12

what distinguishes

a

certain extension is not legitimately
met by use of

the very expression or presupposition of
the very conceptual means in

question to the extension.
So much by way of brief indication of
what might be sought

analysis.

from

Why should we consider whether pleasure
and intrinsic good-

ness are related in some such way?

Well, apart from the intrinsic in-

terest of the question, we can point to these things:

Brentano seems to

have thought that there is such an equivalence, perhaps
an identity, in-

volving the two concepts

JO

On the basis of it he proposed an epi s-

temic criterion of intrinsic goodness 11 and an argument for the propo-

sition that if pleasure is intrinsically good, then so is something
else . 12

Further, some philosophers have had doubts about the nature

or application of intrinsic goodness . 12
ification" by appeal

C.

So what we have called

"clar-

to the concept of pleasure would be worthwhile.

The Form of Epistemic Principles

Our next objective is an epistemic criterion of intrinsic goodness
by use of pleasure.

What does it take to have one of those?

It

is un-

illuminating and misleading to say that it takes "a way of finding out
what is intrinsically good."

That is too broad and too narrow.

that consists in consulting someone who knows does not count, and
posal

does.

A "way"

a

pro-

that merely improves our evidence about what is intrinsically good
The general

situation is this:

There is an ordering of cate-

gories of propositions according to the quality of the evidence we can
have for propositions in the category.

Philosophers dispute what stands

13

where, but it is widely acknowledged
that the contents of sense experience, physical object statements,
and cosmological hypotheses are at
in-

creasingly distant locations in this ordering.
the place to defend, or even to propose,

much.

Any true proposal

a

ranking, but we can say this

maintaining that evidence from one level

ordering lends favorable epistemic status to
candidate for being

is a

a

to have some interest

It j_s

significant if

fact, it suffices for the pro-

In

if it so

in the

proposition further out

significant criterion.

a

the subject matter is of interest.
posal

This introduction is not

relates propositions that have been

reasonably thought to be at such different levels.
There are major differences in strength among these proposals.
For our purposes, the best we could find would be

a

criterion that iden-

tifies some maximally good evidence that depends somehow upon pleasure
for the proposition that

certain state is intrinsically good. That

a

might seem to amount to any true principle of the form:
Cl.

1

Necessarily, if

S

considers

p

and

S

has (such-and-such

a

prop-

osition involving pleasure) as evidence, then nothing is more

reasonable for
But Cl.l is just
Cl. 2

a

S

than that

p

strict conditional.

is

intrinsically good.

Compare:

Necessarily, if Jones has Smith's testimony that there is life
on Mars as evidence, then nothing

is

more reasonable for Jones

than the proposition that he exists.

The pleasure in

a

principle of the form of Cl.l may play no greater role

than the testimony in Cl.

2.

We want the evidence to be what supports

the intrinsic goodness claim, not

a

mere sufficient condition for its

14

having support.

Can we say what it is for one
proposition to lend cre-

dence to another when the one is had as
evidence?
can.

In

"Propositional Justification, "U

weak propositional

I

offer

believe that we

I

a

definition of the

support relation of "tending to confirm."

I

make use

of the preliminary notion:
S

has mini mal

evidence for

=

h

df (i)

h

is

evident for S, and

(ii) there is a p such that
p is evident for S,

evident for

and this is not possible;:

S,

entails but is not entailed by
S,

and

q

entails

there is

a

such that

q

p

entails each thing evident for

say:

I

tends to confirm

=

h

df necessarily, for any S, if

evidence for e, then believing
lieving not

q

entails each thing

h.

On the basis of that,
e

q,

p

h

S

has minimal

is more reasonable for S than be-

h.

By use of the same devices,

we can isolate stronger evidential

re-

lationships:
D1.5

e

justifies

for e, the

D1.6

e

e,

D1.7

e

proves

h

h

h

=

is

Necessarily, if

df.

evident for

= df.

then

h

is

makes

h

certain

=

has minimal

evidence

S.

Necessarily, if

known by

S

S

has minimal

evidence for

S.

df.

Necessarily, if

S

has minimal

dence for e, then nothing is more reasonable for

evi-

than h.

S

Unfortunately, propositional justification relations do not im-

mediately yield means to belief justification.

Consider an

e

which does

15

in fact justify an h, and is of
a more secure epistemic rank
than h.

Those assumptions do not imply:
Cl. 3

Since

S

Necessarily, if

as evidence, then

e

h

is evident for S.

may have e and some countervailing
evidence about h, the mere

possession of
a

S has

e does

not

insure that

h

is evident.

It

is one thing for

proposition to favor another's truth to some
degree, and quite another

for the one to make

a

person under certain specific conditions reason-

able or justified in believing the other.

Obviously, the latter also

depends upon what other evidence the person then has.
I

do not known how to give

of making evident. 15

a

precise explanation of the relation

Qnce we see this difference, though, it becomes

clear that the primary and purely philosophical question for us is

whether some proposition involving

in a crucial

way the concept of

pleasure lends some degree of evidential support to the proposition that
a

state is intrinsically good.

of the sort will

Finding an actually employable criterion

be possible only if there is such a support relation

that underlies it and if we can actually get into the situation described by the antecedent.

(Note that,

make the intrinsic goodness of

tions, then S's total

state evident to

S

proposition can

under certain condi-

evidence in those conditions Dj-justi

state is intrinsically good.)
one that implies that

a

if a pleasure

a

So this is

a

fi es

that the

partly empirical matter, and

suitable propositional justification relation

holds. Thus it is not unreasonable to concentrate on the former kind of

question, at least until we discover

a

successful

proposal.

16

Concerning the philosophical
this sort, little need be said.

significance of

a

true proposal

of

The question whether, and on what ba-

sis, we might know or even reasonably
believe

among the best examples of

a

a

thing to have value is

matter of philosophical interest.

And

there is ample historical justification to search
for evidence of intrinsic goodness that relies upon pleasure in
particular.

certainly turned to it as

Brentano

source of knowledge of intrinsic good-

a

ness, 16 and Meinong probably did. 17

We should take that as good

evidence that there is something of philosophical value to be
learned by

conducting such

a

search.

D.

Philosophical Theories

Finally, we will look into hedoni sm--the theory that singles out

pleasurable experiences as the bearers of intrinsic goodness.
called

a

"theory" of intrinsic goodness.

theory to succeed?

There is

a

What is required for such

genuine problem here.

Dl. 4-analysis of intrinsic goodness.

This is

Suppose we have

a

"theory" of intrinsic goodness?

identify what is intrinsically good.

It

is an

Why is

illuminating way to

And we should not requi re that

a

characteri zation of the intrinsic goods that

is epi stemical ly helpful.

Theories of value qualities, such as Mill's

such

a

"theory" give us

That is

theory of moral rightness, rarely provide any epistemic help.
what we demand of
get it).

a

criterion (though of course we will take

What, then, is peculiar to

a

Then we can say that the bearers

of intrinsic goodness are the states that satisfy its analysans.
not that

a

a

"theory"?

it

where we

17

In

one respect the standard seems to be
more lenient than those

for what was discussed under the title
"analysis"

plain that

a

above.

theory's characterization of the bearers
of

not share any involvement with that

property.

a

D1.4-analysi

s

a

property need

As mentioned above, such

sharing seems requisite for any "analytic" task.
does not show why, e.g.

For it seems

But of course this

fails to be

not insist that there be no sharing of involvements.

a

"theory."

We must

That would unrea-

sonably prejudge, e.g., the question whether the concept
of pleasure
enters into both

a

D1.4-anal ysi

s

and a theory of intrinsic goodness, for

example.
The prominent historical
we seek from a "theory" of

philosopher to have attempted to say what

value property is G.

a

E.

Moore. 18

Speak-

ing of a theory of rightness, he said that we are looking for "the reason why an act is right,"

a

property such that acts are right "because"

they have it. 19

Unfortunately, that account is unsati sfactory.

Strictly, clear

cases of reasons are all considerations by someone for doing something.
Unless we accept cosmological

views attributed to Descartes according to

which someone--God--might really have had

a

reason for making necessary

truths true, this sense of "reason" seems inapplicable here.
uncontroversial

that intrinsic goods are necessarily so.

There is

broader sense of reason that can be very vaguely indicated as:
virtue of which such-and-such.
for

a

But

in that

For it is
a

thing in

sense, the only candidate

"reason" why intrinsic goods are such would seem to be the prop-

erty of intrinsic goodness itself.

"Because" has the first sense

18

attributed to

reason."

It

also expresses causation.

cause for the bearing of an
essential

property.

But there is no

Appeal

to causation

here appears to be entirely
unhelpful.

Moore asserted

properties.

Many philosophers, Ernest Sosa being
the most recent, 20

have appealed to

properties.

distinction between "natural" and
"non-natural"

a

a

distinction between "evaluative" and
"non-eval uati ve"

Equivalences where one side can be taken
to be about one of

the former kinds of properties while the
other side can be taken to be

about one of the latter seem to have special

philosophical

interest.

Most regrettably, though, no tolerably clear
account of either distinction is avail able.

21

I

have none to offer.

Without that, we cannot

sensibly investigate the basis for such interest.

(Also, this would at

best show us what is interesting about certain "theories"
of value properties.

There is no reason to expect that it would lead to

account of what is distinctive about philosophical
I

a

general

"theories.")

must leave it an open question why certain equivalences involv-

ing concepts of interest to philosophers are deemed "theories" of those

concepts.
Our philosophical

interest in proposals such as hedonism for iden-

tifying the bearers of intrinsic goodness needs no excuse.

Because of

their paucity of shared involvements with intrinsic goodness, they are
informative, if true.
a

general

What we lack is not reason to be interested, but

way to mark them off from "analytic" connections on the one

hand and equivalences like e3 where neither side even seems to be about

the other, much less one being

a

"theory" of the other.

19

Theories of intrinsic goodness
like hedonism and its rivals seem
not to be susceptible to clearcut
proof or refutation.

expect them to be supported, then?
things:

First,

a

We can reasonably demand these two

clear statement of the theory.

As an example of what

needs doing, consider the formulation
of hedonism:
of pleasure are intrinsically good."
e6

How should we

"All

What does that tell

and only states
us

about:

Smith being pleased to know that Jones is
pained.

E6 would appear to be

a

"state of pleasure."

hedonist should not count it as good. 22
of hedonism is a clear

And yet intuitively the

The second support we can ask

account of the replies available on behalf of

the theory to objections that have been thought to be
tel ling. 23

E.

The Contents of the Appendix

An appendix is appended.
It

is not central

This gives the thesis an organic unity.

to our inquiry,

since it does not concern any putative

connection between pleasure and intrinsic goodness.
sic goodness and its relation to instrumental

whether an event being of instrumental
occurrence of an intrinsic good.
forward one:

I

It

value.

is about

intrin-

The question is

value of some sort implies the

My approach is the maximally straight-

attempt to identify clearly the concepts of instrumental

value that are in common use, and those that have been topics in discussions of this question.

This done, the concepts virtually speak for

themselves as to whether there is such an implication.

20

Notes to Chapter

I

More precisely, it is not questioned here
that there is a maaltU e 1 tenSlty “ _ th at Pleasures and
pains have in common.
It is asIZ
^
?
^
sumed that we can stipulate an arbitrary
pleasure to have one unit of
intensity and they gain numbers (minus ones
for pains, plus for pleasures) by comparison with that standard.
(For example, let one intensity unit equal the highest intensity of pleasure
attained by the
inventor of the vinyl auto roof in the minute
following the realization
thS significance of hls discovery.) That gives
some quantities for a
£L
hedonistic theory of value to work with. We do not
assume which, if
any, function from those numbers to intrinsic
value ratings is the correct one.
I
believe that even the purely quantitative hedonist has
choices here.
For instance, the intrinsic value might be
the square of
the intensity of the pleasure, and (minus) the cube of
the intensity of
the pain.
This would give us a way to bear out a certain
difficult
saying of Moore's:
i n
.
.
appears to be
Principia Ethica , p. 212)

[ P ]a
(

.

We read in the prefix:

a

far worse evil

"At any given intensity,

than pleasure is

a

good.

..."

2john Bennett in "The Problem of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons" (unpublished manuscript) points out that measurement theory imposes certain constraints on what pleasure and pain can be like if they
are to have this sort of quantifiable aspect.
I
see no grounds to doubt
that these constraints are obeyed in the case of the intensity of these
attitudes.
If, as Bennett contends, we must prove that there is this
obedience, I do not know how to do so.
I
do not know any reason to
think this must be shown, however.
^We should not get carried away about what we can learn about a
concept by seeing what behavior might suffice to teach it, or an expression for it.
The important features of this example are those making it
believable that the child gains awareness of intrinsic goodness with no
awareness of pleasure.
It would not suffice to observe that "intrinsically good" can be taught without expressing or referring explicitly to
the concept of pleasure.
Meanings can be taught by introducing the expressions in situations involving mere cues that make it psychologically
Nothing close to a
normal to bring the appropriate concept to mind.
synonym or conceptual breakdown need be given.
So, from our not finding
a concept expressed or denoted by anything other than the expression
being taught, we cannot validly infer that the concept is not part of
the expression's sense.
is worth looking briefly at an argument that such consideraIt is plausible that the following two means of conveytions suggest:
ing concepts are exhaustive--expl anation in terms of previously acquired
So if the example of the child is
concepts, and ostensive explanation.
It

1

21

possible, then it seems we can conclude
that something other than dIp*
sure is intrinsically good.
For the child was not given an
explicii de
fimtion of intrinsically good.
Thus he must have been shown some
ex"
amp es and he was not shown any
cases of pleasure.
The problem here is"
that explanating in terms of other concepts
does not reduce to providina
9
a synonymous expression as a
definition.
Dictionaries rarely provide
actual synonyms.
The way we acquire concepts by looking
up words in
them includes being guided by the given
definiens (and perhaps some illustrative contexts of use) to latch onto a concept
that it is not psychologically natural or normal then to think of,
though that concept ^s
not expressed by the definiens.
And we can learn a concept by ostentions that do not include even one positive
instance of it if for examp e, our knowledge of the pointer enables
us to think of what he
would (perhaps perversely) take the indicated
items to share.
Very little about what is analytic to a concept can be
inferred from the mere
tact that certain utterances or gestures can
suffice to convey it.
11

^Presented in
published
I
think.

a

seminar at UMass/Amherst

,

in Sprinq 1978.

Un-

,

^Presented in the aforementioned seminar.
6 See

further on in this section for more on such puzzles, and
how they might be solved.
7 The

vast literature on this starts with C. H. Langford,
"Moore^s Notion of Analysis," from P. A. Schlipp (ed.), The Philosophy
of G. E. Moore (New York:
Tudor Park (1952), pp. 319-343.
8 E. Klemke makes this point with
documentation in the chapter
"Analysis" of The Epistemology of G. E. Moore (Evanston:
Northwestern
University Press, 1969), pp. 64-91.
9 If

Chisholm is right that (b) does not involve (a), then coming
to see their equivalence can make a contribution to our understanding of
what is present where brotherhood is instantiated.
It may strain the
metaphor to say that this "illuminates" the concept itself. More precisely, it illuminates those situations where the concept is instantiated.
When the nature of those situations is something we seek to understand about the concept, then it is fair to say that it helps with
our understanding of the concept.
(Note that that is something a
meaning identity claim cannot do for us.)

Wrong

,

lOFranz Brentano, The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and
(New York:
Humanities Press, 1969), p. 18.
1

York:

Ibid

.

,

p.

22.

l^Franz Brentano, The Foundation and Construction of Ethics (New
Humanities Press, 1973), p. 164.

.
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Monroe Beardsley expresses doubts about
the existence or at
actual application, of intrinsic
goodness in "Intrinsic Value"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
25 (1965), pp.
H
traces such reservations to writings by
John Dewey.
t 1e
*

K

^ Philosophical

Studies

,

forthcoming.

^Mark Pastin has made several efforts in this
direction.
See,
e.g., Warranting Reconsidered," Synthese
38 (1978), pp. 459-464.
For
problems with Pastin's approach, see Fred Feldman,
"Final Comments on
the Analysis of Warranting," Synthese 38
(1978), pp. 465-469.
1

6 Brentano,

22 .

The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong

17 A.

Meinong, On Emotional Presentatio n (Evanston:
University Press, 19/2), p. 121
E.

pp.

Moore, Ethics (London:

19-20.

,

p.

Northwestern

Oxford University Press, 1965),

19g. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (London:
Press, 1903), pp. 39-41.

Cambridae Universitv

20ln Ernest Sosa, "The Foundations of Foundational
forthcoming).

i

sm,"

(Nous,

21 Good criticisms of what Moore says about
the "natural/nonnatural" property distinction appear in Fred Feldman, Introductory
Ethics (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1978), pp. 203-205.
Sosa does
not attempt to explain the "eval uative/non-eval uative" property distinction.
I
know of no good account elsewhere.

22d 4.9 of Chapter
hedonic value.

^This

IV

is attempted

below excludes e6 as

a

basic bearer of

in Chapter IV below in sections D-F.

CHAPTER

II

PLEASURE AND THE ANALYSIS OF
INTRINSIC GOODNESS
Many philosophers have sought
analytic connections between posi-

tive emotive attitudes and intrinsic
goodness. 1
that appeal

to pleasure in

Indeed, proposals

particular continue to be made. 2

As

I

es-

timate the sitaution, such connections can
be fully investigated by

carefully examining what is said and suggested by
certain writings by
Franz Brentano on the topic.

The fundamental

among accounts with some initial
in

a

study of Brentano's work.

plausibility

variations and problems
arise quite naturally

all

That is how the topic will be approached

here.

Methodologically speaking, if the remarks about "analysis" in the
Introduction are correct, then there are several

lationships which might be discovered.

sorts of "analytic" re-

Two factors stand out as appro-

priate tests for the presence of such connections.

First, we have seen

that necessary equivalence is requisite for any such link.

terexample precludes any such tie.
liability.

So a coun-

And second, circularity is

a

major

Circular equivalences can bring to light non-obvious impli-

cations of the concept at stake.

tinctively "analytic" tasks:
"constructing" concepts.

^

But they cannot accomplish the dis-

removing obscurity, reducing ontology,

Thus, only after these two tests have been

passed would it be worthwhile to sort out which "analytic" tasks an

equivalence performs.

23

—

^
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—

-nitla1 Readings of Brentano's Analysis

Brentano's main purpose in The Origin
of Our Knowledge of

Right.

an d Wrong 4 is to say how we can
gain adequate evidence for judgments

concerning the moral

status of acts.

In

his view that evidence partly

consists in what we can know to be good and
bad.

He

proposed criteria

by means of which we are to be able to
acquire such knowledge.

Some

comments in the essay are clearly intended as
some sort of explanations
of concepts of goodness.

These criteria and comments suggest interest-

ing and intuitively attractive equivalences
between conditions involving

pleasure and intrinsic goodness.

Those suggestions will be developed

and assessed here.

The first passage we should look at is this one:
We call

a

thing good when the love relating to it is correct.

In

the broadest sense of the term, the good is that which is worthy of
love, that which can be loved with

a

love that is correct.

24 Among the things that please us, we may distinguish between those

that are pleasing in themselves and those which are pleasing in virtue of something else.

In

the latter case, the thing is pleasing in

virtue of what it brings about or preserves or makes probable.
Hence we must distinguish between primary and secondary goods--

between what is good in itself and what is good in virtue of something else.
good.

The useful

is a clear example of the latter type of

25

The part of this citation
before section 24 plainly is not
intended to
be an account of intrinsic
goodness.
Brentano surely means the distinction between “what is good in
itself" and “what is good in
virtue of

something else" to be the distinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic
goodness.

And while the first part of the
citation is said to be about

“good" read “in the broadest sense of
the term," the citation is fol-

lowed with the remark that the good in
itself is the “'good'

row sense.

6

But it will

in its nar-

be seen that on one interpretation
Brentano

is drawing upon part of his account of
the “broadest" sense of "good"

when he tells us about the good in itself in
section 24.

So it is

worthwhile to have the whole citation available as one
piece.
How shall

self?

we understand the cited comments about the good in
it-

There is no clinching indication what sort of explanation
of the

concept of intrinsic goodness is being attempted.

The use of "hence" in

the passage suggests that the distinction between what is
intrinsically

good and what is extri nsical ly good is supposed to follow directly and

obviously from the fact that some things are "pleasing

in themselves"

and others are "pleasing in virtue of something else."

So the closer

the connection between being pleasing in itself and being intrinsically
good on the one hand, and being pleasing in virtue of something else and

being extri nsical ly good on the other, the better justified is the remark.

Also, an equivalence between the former pair would give us

matically simple link between pleasure and intrinsic goodness.
behooves us to consider it.

a

dra-

So it

26

What exactly are these two
ways of being pleasing?
fers no explanation.

The simplest view seems to
be this:

Brentano ofWe assume

without explanation the two place
relation of something being an object
of pleasure

for a person.

We also assume the three place
relation of

something being an object of pleasure for

a

that the person takes to be brought about,
by the first.

02,1

pleasure for

$

in virtue of q = df.

because

S

takes it that

S

serves, or makes probable
p

preserved, or made probable

Then we stipulate:

£J_§ pleasing for

*2

person because of something

is pl easing

is an object of

brings about, pre-

q.

itself for

in

p

p

S

=

df.

p

is an object of pleas-

ure for S, and there is no
q such that p is pleasing for S in

virtue of q.7

Applying this distinction to the text in the most straightforward way,
we get:

D2.3

As

intrinsically good

p

is

p

is pleasing

=

df.

itself for

in

There is someone, S, such that

S.

pleasing as D2.3 is in virtue of the relatively simple tie it

asserts between pleasure and intrinsic goodness, it is unacceptable.
Moreover, it should not finally be attributed to Brentano, since he
gives what is in effect an excellent counterexample to D2.3 almost imme-

diately after our first citation:
[I]t often happens as

merely as
alone.
8

a

a

result of habit that what is first desired

means to something else comes to be desired for itself

Thus the miser is reduced to heaping up riches irrationally

27

Thus Brentano describes

a

case where something intrinsically
neutral--

the miser acquiring riches-becomes
desired (and, we can assume, pleasing)

in itself for him.

Another problem for D2.3 is that it
is plainly asking too much
of
the intrinsically good things to
require that each actually be the object of someone's pleasure.

Were difficulties of these two sorts
the only faults in D2.3, it
could be repaired with ease.

In

cases like that of the miser, the

states that become pleasing in themselves do
not start out that way.

It

may be credible that they would only come to
be pleasing in thesmelves
as

result of habituation.

a

We might then interpret Brentano to have

been proposing that the intrinsic goods are states
which are spontane-

ously pleasing in themselves.

To meet the second difficulty, we can

read the proposal as explicitly giving only

most natural modification to gain

a

sufficient condition.

a

The

necessary and sufficient condition

has intrinsic goods being possible objects of the right sort of pleas-

ure.

Those two changes yield:
D2.4

is

p

intrinsically good

and a time, t,

=

df.

Possibly, there is someone,

such that p is pleasing in itself for

and at no time up to

t

was there

a

q

such that

p

s

S,

at t,

was pleasing

to S in virtue of q.

Brentano provides in the essay the basic materials for

example to D2.4, too.

"...

we
.

.

.

they

a

counter-

Soon after our first citation, he suggests that

imagine now another species quite different from ourselves;
.

.

.

despise insight and love error for its own sake." 9

28

We have

a

counterexample to 02.4 when we supplement
the case with the

modest further assumptions that the
species takes the attitude spontaneously, that error is not intrinsically
good, and that such
is

possible.

not

a

species

Even if normal humans do not take such
attitudes, we can-

plausibly preclude their possibility.
It

is worth adding that there are many
who are spontaneously

pleased by various

i

ntri nsical ly neutral

thought that the universe had

a

states.

Some delight in the

beginning; others take joy in the

thought that it is not the case that the universe had

a

beginning.

Some

members of each group do not find their thought about the
origin of the
universe delightful because of anything else, and never did.
take it as axiomatic that not both

trinsically good.

In

a

state and its negation are in-

this case it is plausible that each is neutral.

The sort of objection raised for D2.4 indicates
for its approach.

Yet we can

a

basic problem

D2.4 claims that the intrinsic goodness of something

is implied by the possibility of someone addressing

psychological attitude toward it.

a

simple kind of

But reflection reveals no credibility

to the supposition that the possible extension of any such attitude is

restricted in

a

ly unrestricted

normatively interesting way.

(perhaps one of the few exceptions is that the most bla-

tant of contradictions cannot be believed).
will

isolate the intrinsic goods.

Thus no attitude by itself

When evaluating such

have only to remind ourselves how irrational
and how base.

Indeed, they seem virtual-

a

proposal, we

people can be, how willful,

We then see that such attempts are not promising.^ 0

29

And we also see that restrictions
upon what other attitudes have
been,

or are being, held do not significantly
improve the account.

—Revised

In terpretations of

Brentano's Analysis

Obviously the possibility remains that
non-attitudinal restrictions on pleasures will work.

gating

way in which we may have misconstrued the
initially cited re-

a

marks.

We can approach that question by
investi-

Looking back at the passage, we see that Brentano
distinguishes

the two ways of being pleasing right after having
spoken of “love" that
is "correct."

love

Now it is clear from several

is being used there in a

comments in the essay that

particularly broad manner.

In

one

place, he writes of giving preference to one thing over another
as
"loving" the one "more" than the other. 11
a

natural

feeling of pleasure is

a

He

also writes that

higher love

.

.

."12

"...

Thus it seems

proper to interpret some of his uses of "love" to be his way to express
a

variety of attitudes involving the taking of pleasure.

that Brentano meant still

section 24.

to be discussing

The two ways of being pleasing

So

it may be

"love" that is "correct" in
(i.e., "loved") would then

be asserted there to identify the two sorts of goods when the pleasure
is

"correct ."

That allows us to read Brentano to equate being

intri nsical ly good with being possibly correctly pleasing in itself for

someone.
But of course to understand that we need to know what Brentano

meant by "correct" in the passage.

It

is vital

that we learn what we

can from Brentano about this concept of correctness, anyway.

He makes

30

use of it in his criterion for
determining that

good,

a

topic of Chapter III.

it would be helpful

a

thing is intrinsically

Unfortunately, we are told much less
than

to know about the notion.

very roughly what Brentano had in mind.

It

is not

hard to say

Correctness is to be

a

property

of some emotive attitudes that is closely
analogous to the property of

truth as it pertains to beliefs. 13
be

Some feelings toward things are to

the right attitude to take" given their
value, just as belief is the

right epistemic attitude to take toward what is
true.
The way Brentano introduces the concept of
correctness in the

essay is as follows.
logical

acts:

First he distinguishes three categories of
psycho-

having ideas or "presentations," making judgments, and

undergoing emotions.

The latter two,

unlike the former, are said to in-

volve an important type of opposition.

In

the category of making judg-

ments, this opposition relates affirmation to denial;

in the

category of

undergoing emotions, it relates love to hate, and being pleased to being
displeased.

No opposition is

found in the category of having ideas.

Brentano follows those claims with this:
This fact has an important consequence.
long to the first class [having

or incorrect.

Psychological

acts that be-

ideas] cannot be said to be correct

But in the case of acts that belong to the second

class [making judgments], one of the two opposing modes of

rel a-

tion--affi rmat ion and denial--is correct and the other is incorrect,
as logic has taught since ancient times.
is true in the third class.

Naturally, the same thing

Of the two opposing types of feeling--

5

,
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loving and hating, being pleased and
being

eased--i

di spl

n

every in-

stance one of them is correct and the other
is incorrect.!
This passage is immediately followed by
the first citation above.
We gain a loose but workable grip upon the
concept from this account.
It

is valuable to proceed with this degree of
understanding, if only in

order to find out where we need more information.
can do better on the basis of texts alone.

chapter

I

try to explain the residual

In

I

do not see how we

the last sections of this

unclarity about correctness.

We can now consider the proposal

that to be intrinsically good is

to be possibly pleasing in itself, where the pleasure is
correctly

taken

,

i

.e.

D2.5

pis

intrinsically good

= df.

Possibly, there is someone,

such that p is pleasing in itself for S, and that

ject of pleasure for

S

D2.5 seems to be too weak.

p

S,

is an ob-

is correct. 16

For anything that might be overall

good seems to be a possible object of correctly taken pleasure, though

that cannot be definitely established without
rectness.

a

fuller account of cor-

At the beginning of the first passage cited above, Brentano

holds that anything "good" in the "broadest" sense is
of correctly taken pleasure.

est" sense:

It

a

possible object

is not clear what is to be that

"broad-

perhaps it is to be overall goodness, perhaps the disjunc-

tion of intrinsic and extrinsic goodness.

But on either reading,

some

things that are not intrinsically good would be possible objects of correctly taken pleasure.

For on either reading, intrinsically neutral

overall goods could be objects of correctly taken pleasure.

And
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intuitively speaking, if intrinsic
goodness makes something

a

ting" or "correct" object of
pleasure, then so does overall

goodness.

"fit-

At least it seems that any notion
of correctness that excludes
that pos-

sibility must be more completely explained.

is

It

also plausible that

an intrinsically indifferent overall
good might be pleasing in itself
for someone.

So it

seems that too much satisfies the
definiens of D2.5.

A conceivable defense of D2.5 against
this sort of charge consists
in claiming that there are epistemic
restrictions on when pleasure taken
in what is somehow good

to get

is correct.

These requirements might be thought

in the way of a non-intri nsic

,

overall

good being pleasing in it-

self for someone in the appropriate epistemic situation.
But what requirements would work?

None that

I

have found.

For

example, it does not help if the person must know that the neutral
overall

good for the pleasure to be correct.

is

Smith might know that

there being radar is overall good, but be unmoved emotionally by that
fact, and by anything he takes to be brought about, preserved, or made

probable by radar.

He need

be no more than

glad nonetheless that there is radar.

a

little bit screwy to feel

He would then

pass the conditions

for it being correctly pleasing to him, and pleasing in intself.

Another modification might seem better.

Perhaps we should require

that the pleasing in itself relationship be correct, rather than just
the pleasure taken in the object.

D2.6

p

is

intrinsically good

Then we have:
=

df.

Possibly, there is someone,

such that p is pleasing in itself for S, and that
ing

in itself for S is correct.

p

is

S

pleas-
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Epi stemic

considerations seem actually to work
against D2.6.

Con-

sider someone who has fine evidence
concerning something which is not in
fact

intrinsically good.

Suppose the person manages to summon
up

a

pleasurable regard for that thing, and not
in virtue of anything else.
Intuitively, that appears to be
to take.
It

"fitting"or "correct" atittude for him

a

That would refute D2.6, though.

might be replied that this last example
fails to accommodate

Brentano's analogy between correctness and truth.

Pleasure under the

described circumstances would be analogous to
justified false belief,
and thus not really correct.

The trouble with this reply is that pleasure in itself
toward the

intrinsically indifferent overall good seems sufficiently analogous
to
true belief to refute D2.6.

Now

I

do not wish to deny that there is

a

way to construe "correctness" where only intrinsic goods are possible

objects of

a

certain sort

of "correct" pleasure. 17

must conclude that, in the absence of

a

But

I

think we

suitable clarification of the

nature of correctness, the D2.5-D2.6 approach does not appear to succeed.

C.

Analysis by Use of Brentano's Criterion

Just after the first citation above, Brentano writes, "So much for

the concept of the good." 1 ^

Brentano proceeds to offer

trinsically good.

It

But we should not let that discourage us.
a

criterion for knowing something to be in-

seems to adapt to yield an account of intrinsic

)
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goodness, one that appears better
equipped to cope with the epistemic
problems that arose above.
Here is his (terse) formulation of
the criterion:

...
al

in the case of [pleasure in
the clarity of insight] the natur-

feeling of pleasure is

correct.

a

higher love that is experienced as being

When we ourselves experience such a
love we notice not

only that the object is loved and capable
of being loved
also that it is worthy of being loved
good

...

.

.

but

and therefore that it is

J9

Here, then, is Brentano's criterion in his own
(translator

words

,

1

s

:

C2.1

If

S

has

a

natural

feeling of pleasure toward

ences that feeling as being correct, then

p

p

and

S

experi-

is known by S to

be intrinsically good.

Of course, to understand C2.1 we have to understand what it is for
an

emotion to be "experienced as being correct."

Brentano tries to explain

that notion by analogy with our knowledge of sel f-warranted propositions. He begins by contrasting "blind" or "impulsive" judgments with

"insightful" or "evident" ones, where examples of the latter are to

include belief in the law of non-contradiction and our knowledge of our
own perceptual

states.

After noting that the difference between the two

kinds of judgments is not
If

a

matter of degree of conviction, he writes:

one were to ask [concerning an immediately evident belief]

do you really believe that?'

...

it

‘Why

would be impossible to find
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rational

grounds

.

.

.

but

.

.

.

the clarity of the judgment is such

as to enable us to see that
the question has no point

.

.

.21

Brentano then asserts:
.

.

.

[there is] an analogous distinction between
the higher and

lower types of activity in the emotional

higher mode of being pleased

...

it

sphere

.

.

..there is

is the analog of

a

something

being evident in the sphere of judgment. 22

Apparently, Brentano holds that "experiencing
pleasure as being

correct" amounts to being immediately aware of having

a

"higher love,"

where the obvious presence of the emotion parallels the
"clarity" of the

judgement, and the

height

of the emotion constitutes its correctness.

What is this elevated type of pleasure, this "higher love"?

does not further identify it.

The best construal

Brentano

seems to be that he

means to refer to some species of liking that is the intuitive opposite
to "blind" or unreflect ive favoring, something like contemplative ap-

proval.
C2.

1

The reading of C2.1 this suggests is:
a

If it is self-evident to S that S is feeling contemplative ap-

proval

for p, then p is known by S to be intrinsically good.

We can take
it

"self-evident" in an intuitive sense for now, and take

for granted that this sort of approval

feels it.

It

it give us a

is plain that C2.

1

a

is not

is
a

self-evident to the one who

credible criterion, nor does

plausible equivalence with intrinsic goodness.

brief consideration of the variety of attitudinal

First,

a

propensities that ob-

tain should convince us that not only intrinsic goods are objects of the

"exalted" approval

of C2. 1 a (or any other kind of attitude).

And of
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course the attitude will be
self-evidently present when addressed
toward something not intrinsically
good,
too.

Second, on this interpre-

tatation the high-toned nature of the
feeling constitutes the correctness of the emotion.

approval

Yet C2.1a has it that correct
(i.e., high-grade)

attaches only to what is

i

ntri nsical ly good.

This makes it

very hard to understand how Brentano could
consistently say that any-

thing good in the "broadest" sense can be
correctly loved, as he does in
the first quote above.

This strongly suggests that we should seek

a

better interpretation of "experiencing pleasure as
being correct."
Fortunately,

credence by part of

better reading is available.

a

a

It

is given

letter from Brentano to Oscar Kraus.

added

Brentano

there attempts to say how we acquire the concept of correctness.

He

claims that we do it by observing several emotive acts that exemplify
it
and seeing it as something they have in common.

Then he writes:

We know with immediate evidence that certain of our emotive atti-

tudes are correct.

...

We will

find that there are others whose

...

emotive attitudes correspond to our own.
should happen to be only

a

If

their attitudes

matter of habit or instinct we may still

say that they are correct but not that they are experienced as being

correct.

.

.

.

One can never find the criterion of correctness in an

adaequatio rei et intellectus vel amoris

,

it can be found only in

those attitudes which we know with immediate evidence to be correct . 23
The interpretation that is thereby made reasonable reads "experi-

encing pleasure as being correct" to mean making

a

sel

f-warranti ng

37

judgment that the pleasure is correct.
C2.1b

If S feels

for
p

contemplative approval

that it is correct for

S

known by

is

We should have

a

So we get:

for p and it is self-evident

S to

feel

that way about p, then

to be intrinsically good.

S

somewhat precise notion of self-evidence
to work with.

But first let us get before us the thing
that is our principal concern
in this chapter:

the criterion.

the equivalence with intrinsic goodness
suggested by
Of course we must not suppose that each
intrinsic good

is actually an object of approval.

But if we make the reasonable as-

sumption that C2. lb is necessarily true if true at all,
then if C2.1b is
correct only intrinsic goods can satisfy its conditions.
safe to say that if any can, then they all

can.

And it seems

So here

is our new ana-

lyzing proposal:

D2.7

p

intrinsically good

is

such that

S,

S

It

will

df.

Possibly, there is

feels contemplative approval

self-evident for
about

=

S

for

p,

a

person,

and

it is

that it is correct for S to feel that way

p.

be harmless and helpful

to use this concept of self-

evidence:

D2.8

p

is

self-evident for

S

=

df if

p

is true; p is

evident for S;

and for any q such that q makes p evident for s, q entail s^4
P-

Roughly, D2.8 permits only

things evident for

S

p

itself and conjunctions of

to make p evident when p is sel

p

with other

f-evident.^
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There is trouble for D2.7.
broadest" sense

1

Recall

that being "good" in the

to be a necessary condition

s

correctly taken pleasure.

for being an object of

But can what is self-evident
for

ever guarantee that something is
"good" in that sense?

a

person

If not,

it could

not be self-evident that a state
passes this requironent of "broad"

goodness for being an object of correct
pleasure.

And that would be

barrier to the correctness itself being
self-evident.

a

"Broadest" good-

ness cannot be self-evident if the sense
of "good" in question is that
of being overal

1

good.

The state's causal

contributions cannot be self-

evident, and they must be known to determine its
overall value status.
If

instead the

extri ns ic

al

1

broadest" sense is that of being either intrinsically
or

y good, then there is no obvious problem here.

If D2.7 is

right, then something that it contends can be self-evident
implies the

intrinsic goodness of the state at stake.

So the necessary condition on

this reading of "good" would automatical
ly be met.
But this latter reading creates another problem:

Is

it really

correct to contemplatively approve of something intrinsically good but

disasterous in its consequences?

If not,

there would be no way for the

correctness of the approval to be self-evident.
think there
rect."

_i_s

a

And it seems not.

I

reading making such approval of an intrinsic good "cor-

But it brings to light considerations that make grave trouble

for the whole D2.7 approach.

thing else that is

raise that problem.

a

So

I

want to postpone that to try some-

reasonable interpretation and does not directly
The point right here is that the meager intuitions

.
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that are apparently good ones to
use given Brentano's account of

correctness make it doubtful that approval
can be self-evidently
correct
It

may be that the sort of "love" that
Brentano intends in his

comments about the "broadest" sense of "good"
does not include the
pleasing in itself variety.
seemed to fail
dence.

Such

a

consideration led us to D2.6, which

essentially because of the possibility of misleading
evi-

But the self-evidence requirement of the D2.7
approach might

help with the problematic sort of epistemic
situation.

well

In

order

also to accommodate the notion of "higher love," we
can concoct the

phrase

approved in itself," where

p

is

so

approved just when contempla-

tively approved, and not in virtue of anything else.
Now we can have:

D2.9

p

intrinsically good

is

such that

p

is approved

= df.

in

Possibly, there is someone,

itself by

S,

approved is correct is self-evident for

and that

p

S,

being so

S.

The concept of being approved in itself is supposed to capture the idea
of being approved "for its own sake," approved "for what it is, rather

than what it does."

To the extent that what is intuitive in those

phrases is captured, it seems more reasonable in the case of D2.9 than
in that of D2.7 to say that such approval

of something intrinsically

good is "correct" whether or not the thing is overall

seems to make

a

good.

Thus D2.9

more credible demand on what can be self-evident than

D2.7.

D2.9 is an interesting equivalence.

refutes it.

It

is

I

see no example that clearly

not manifest whether what it requires to be self-
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evident really can be.

I

think determining that goes beyond
the rough

intuitions about correctness to be gained
from Brentano's comments about
But

it.

I

see some reasonable temptation to say
that we could determine

the relevant correctness by inspection
alone.

for that temptation
It

is time to

,

What

I

take to account

however, ultimately undermines D2.9.
improve our understanding of correctness.

Brentano's analogy of correctness to truth lead us to
try to take it to
be a one place property.

ness.

I

I

believe there is no such concept of correct-

suggest that what is meant by the kind of use of "correct" in-

tended in D2.9 is

a

relation. 26

Other locutions, clearly synonymous

with "correct" in many contexts, are always expressions for relations.
When the topic is the evaluation of actions, it is merely

a

question of

terminology whether we say that an action is "proper" or "correct."
a

relational

sense is intended.

An action can be "proper"

spect and not "proper" in another.

rudely into
spared
If

a

a

in one re-

Jones knows that only by breaking

conversation between Smith and Robinson can Robinson be

painful

revelation, then it might be that Jones should do it.

so, then the act would be both

incorrect).

If

Yet

proper (or correct) and improper (or

For it would be morally proper and improper etiquette.

Such an example can show us that "proper" and "correct" at least often

express relations where one term is not explicitly mentioned.

Context

typically determines what it is.
It

might be thought obvious that "correct" sometimes expresses

one place property.

that it is true.

We say that a belief is "correct"

But even there,

I

a

and seem to mean

think our precise meaning is that

-
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the belief is correct with regard
to its truth value.

Note that true

beliefs are also "incorrect" when
they are politically forbidden.
propose that

a

1

relation is always expressed.

One immediate benefit of that
view is the easy explanation it pro-

vides for our trouble in being
satisfactorily clear about what Brentano

meant by "correct."

Since he makes no mention of what it is in
relation

to which the pleasure is to be correct,
and since his analogy with truth

stifles any attempt to be guided by context,
it is no wonder we had
hard time deciding important questions about
its application.

a

The case

is analogous to that of being told that
there is a notion of usefulness

which is much like truth, and then being told that

a

category of things are "useful" in that sense.

is

It

certain interesting
likely that con-

text would help somewhat in determining what purpose the
things were to
be useful

for.

But the analogy and the absence of explicit relata would

allow us at best only
If "correct"

approval

to

a

rough understandi ng . 27

expresses

a

relation in D2.9, relative to what is the

be self-evidently correct?

and truth value clearly will

not do.

Familiar terms like moral

the former case, consequent!'

In

ists have it that there is no way for the moral
proval

to be self-evident.

i

a

feature of

the value of its consequences

versus the value of its alternatives' consequences.

non-consequential

al

status of an act of ap-

They say it is determined by

the act that contemplation cannot reveal:

cult to speak for all

status

It

is more diffi-

sts on this question, but any

plausible moral theory will have it be possibly morally correct for an
intrinsic neutral

to be approved

in

itself by someone.

After all, it is
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a

harmless and pleasant mental

can be self-evidently moral

episode under most conditions.

And if it

to do this approving in the case of an in-

trinsic good, it is reasonable to suppose that it can
also be so in the
case of an intrinsic neutral.

status rel ati vi sation of D2.9.

But then the neutral
So D2.9 fails.

correctness makes D2.9 amount to this:

The truth value sort of

pis intrinsically

when it is possible that it is self-evident for some
proved in itself by

S.

satisfies the moral

S

good just

that

p is ap-

The point about the unrestricted application of

attitudes shows that that is wrong.

Any state might be approved in it-

self, and approving can be self-evidently directed toward non-i ntri nsi

c

goods just as well as toward intrinsic goods.
A rel at i

vi

sation that does not seem open to counterexamples has it

that the approving is self-evidently correct with regard to the value
status of the thing approved.

Not overall

value status.

As already

mentioned, it cannot be self-evident that one is approving an overall
good.

D2.9 is most plausibly held to lack counterinstances when the ap-

proving is to be self-evidently correct with regard to the intrinsic
value status of the approved.

Here is

a

principle to which

I

have no

objection:
P2.1

Necessarily,

p

is intrinsically good iff possibly, p is ap-

proved in itself by someone, and that approval

is correct

with regard to the intrinsic value status of p.

Perhaps in the case of each intrinsic good it is possible that it be

self-evident for someone that that person's approval in itself of the
intrinsic good is correct with regard to its intrinsic value status.

I
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see no good way to argue that that
cannot be.

If

it can, then the fol-

lowing equivalence would seem to be
acceptable as well:
P2.2

Necessarily,
such that

is

P2.1

and

p

is

p

is approved

intrinsically good iff possibly, someone,

approved in itself by

S

sic value status of

is

p

s

i

a

P2.1

p

being

S.

embodies the intuition that

a

state for its own sake is appropriate to

the value status of the intrinsic goods only.
tional

and that

correct with regard to the intrin-

self-evident to

P2.2 merit contemplation.

certain high-minded liking of

in itself by S,

S,

P2.2 embodies the addi-

intuition that this liking can show itself to accord with the

value status.
But these cannot be analyses.
sic

value status of

a

thing?

ness, neutrality, or evil.

It

What is the concept of the intrin-

is the concept of its intrinsic

good-

So D2.9 is rendered circular by use of that

concept.

The Requirement Interpretation of Correctness

D.

There is

a

last interpretation of correctness that we should try.

Perhaps the approval
its object."

is to be self-evidently correct

"with respect to

This tells us that Jones contemplatively approving of

Smith being happy would be correct with respect to Smith being happy

itself.

Can we make sense of this?

correctness to be the relation of

a

I

think so, if we take this kind of

thing being fitting for something,

or we use its converse--the relation of requirement.

At times,

Brentano
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characterizes correctness in terms of

fi

ttingness.28

Examples by

Chisholm help to clarify the idea:
.

.

.

promise-making requires--or calls for--promi
se-keepi ng

;

being

virtuous, according to Kant, requires being
rewarded; the dominant

seventh requires the chord of the tonic; one
color in the lower left
calls for
It

complementary color in the upper right. 29

a

has been proposed tht we sometimes "experience"
requirements.

Maurice Mandelbaum holds the relation to create the basis
for felt moral
demands; he holds that we then experience
for an action. 20

So this

a

requi rement by

a

situation

sort of correctness might have the requisite

possible self-evidence.
Thus we ought to consider this proposition:

D2.10

p

is

intrinsically good

to whom it

is

=

Possibly there is someone,

df.

self-evident that

tively approved by

p

requires

p

S,

being contempla-

S.

D2.10 has commendable features.

If,

as Pl.l says, it is appropri-

ate to the value status of intrinsic goods to contemplatively approve of
them, and, as PI.

2

says, this might be seen by considering whether such

affection is required, so much the better for D2.10 as well as P2.1 and
P2.2.

Intuition might reveal that overall

be fittingly favored when seen as such.

that the neutral
good.

So

good intrinsic neutrals can

But it cannot be self-evident

has the requisite extrinsic credentials to be overall

such neutrals seem not to satisfy D2.10.

Finally, though, it seems to me that there is trouble for D2.10.
And it is of

a

sort that appears to undermine any pleasure-based
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analysis of intrinsic goodness.

The difficulty can be brought out by

asking what really makes us think that
pleasure is especially appro-

priately taken in things having positive value.
influences like moral

Contingently associated

indoctrination aside, the degree to which the ex-

perience is enjoyable does not depend upon the
value of its object.

degree of pleasure logically or psychologically
requires

a

No

good object.

What does make the apparent fit, then?
First,

I

contend that there is no such fittingness that is present

in the case of every sort of liking.

D2.ll

p

is

intrinsically good

=

Consider:
df.

Possibly there is someone,

such that it is self-evident for
1

ustful ly thrill

D2.ll is not plausible.

i

ng to

Why?

S

that

p

requires

p

being

S.

is more difficult to thrill

It

lustfully

in certain lofty states than to contemplatively approve of them.

believe that that is

a

intuitive difference.

In

object is somehow good.

brief,

I

I

think what explains the special suita

belief that its

This is clear in the case of taking pride, ad-

miring, and appreciating.

I

think it is also quite plain in the case of

the lofty emotion we have been usi ng--contemplati ve approval.
is always

But

distraction which does not really account for the

ability of the "high" pleasures is that each implies

approval

S,

approval

In

fact,

out of regard for some (believed) feature of

the object of approval, where the object is believed thereby to be some-

how good.
Now we should ask--What sort of goodness is ascribed to

most credible construal of D2.10?

p

on the

Perhaps some intrinsic goods are
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aesthetically good, and they require
approval out of aesthetic regard
for them.

But not all

--ntrinsic

goods.

intrinsic goods.

Only approval

g° odn ess seems exactly fitting for all

So the

out of regard for

and only intrinsic

precisely stated equivalence that intuition
actually

favors is:
£. is intrinsical ly good = df.

Possibly, there is someone,

such that it is self-evident for S that

contemplatively approved by

p

requires

p

S,

being

out of regard for p's intrinsic

S

goodness.
If,

as

believe, this is the best "requi rement" account that is finally

I

intuitively acceptable, then we have not improved upon D2.9 on its best
reading after all.
As

I

Obviously D2.12 too is circular.

see it, the general

situation concerning

alyses of intrinsic goodness is this:

pi

easure-based an-

No more fit can be

seen in the

sheer taking of pleasure in an intrinsic good than in the same attitude
toward an intrinsic neutral.

There

_is_

a

special

appropriateness to cer-

tain sorts of pleasure in the intrinsic goods--the sorts with an impli-

cation of believed goodness.

But when we think narrowly and sharply

about just when these attitudes seem precisely called for, we see that
it

is

when they involve recognition of the intrinsic goodness of their

objects.
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To

identify exactly the required attitudes in our equiva-

lence, we must use the concept of intrinsic goodness on both sides.

Thus such equivalences may be interesting, but as analyses they are

circular.

.
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CHAPTER

III

PLEASURE AND THE DISCOVERY OF
INTRINSIC GOODNESS
The question here is whether
pleasure can help us learn which

things are

1

ntn nsical

ly good.

A proposal

according to which pleasure

does just that is one of the
most significant assertions in
Brentano's
Th e Origin of Our Knowledge
of Righ t and Wrong

above.

We must study that proposal

1

offered

a

here.

,

as was mentioned

Charles Baylis has also

pleasure-based criterion of intrinsic
goodness that merits our

consideration.

2

So we will

A.

give it that.

Tests for Epistemic Principles

How is an epistemic test for intrinsic
goodness to be tested?

form of such
p

a

E's

proposal
q

The

seems best understood to be:

being intrinsically good,

where "E" stands for expressions of propositional

support relations such

as tending to confirm and justifying, 2 and "p"
expresses some condi-

tion involving pleasure.

Since we would most like to find

intrinsic goods can be discovered in the first place,

p

a

way that

should state

something that is intuitively possibly evident without any other evi-

dence about intrinsic goodness (in contrast with testimonial

evidence

from an expert, for example, where we would need other evidence about

intrinsic goodness to discern his expertise).

And the proposal

allay doubts about evidence for intrinsic goodness if it appeals to

condition less well justifiable than the proposition that

50

q

is

not

will
a
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intrinsically good.
is

satisfiable by

a

Finally, such a criterion is
unsatisfactory if it

diversity of q's that are not
intrinsically good on

any plausible value theory,
unless it is supplemented by an
account
showing how to exclude those.
The principle is not shown
false by being
thusly satisfied, since there
is such a thing as misleading
evidence.
But without a way to narrow
down at least to things controversially
re-

garded as intrinsically good, we
have no reason to believe that it
is
even guiding us toward the intrinsic
goods.

B.

Brentano

1

s

Criterion

Unfortunately, Brentano is quite brief on the
topic of
intrinsic goodness.
II. 4

a

test for

The relevant passages were all cited in
Chapter

Here is the statement of the test itself again:

...
al

in the case of [pleasure in the clarity of
insight] the natur-

feeling of pleasure is

ing correct.

higher love which is experienced as be-

a

When we ourselves experience such

a

love we notice not

only that the object is loved and capable of being loved
also that it is worthy of being loved

[intrinsical ly] good.
To reiterate briefly the

.

.

.

.

.

.

but

and therefore that it is

5

i

nterprtations of Chapter 1,6 "being correct"

seems best read to express the relation of fittingness, to "experience

[the fit] as being correct" seems best read to assert the fit to be
sel fevident

,

and the pleasure which is "a higher love"

as contemplative approval

.

In

seems best read

pursuit of an analysis of intrinsic good-

ness, these readings lead us to:
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D2 ' 12

£-ls

i

n trinsicall_^

_good

= df.

Possibly, there is someone,

S,

such that it is self-evident
for S that p requires
p being

contemplatively approved by

S

out of regard for p's intrinsic

goodness.
For all the critical

comments of Chapter

II

show, the left and

right sides of D2.12 may be
necesssarily equivalent.

tion to that equivalence.

Our question here, though,

I

have no objec-

is whether we can

extract from D2.12 evidence involving
pleasure for intrinsic goodness.
We could approach that question
by considering whether the right side
of

D2.12 evidentially supports the left,
i.e.:
E3.1

It

being self-evident for some

templatively approved by

S out

goodness tends to confirm that
But

I

S

that

p

requires

p

being con-

of regard for p's intrinsic
p

is intrinsical ly good.

think that E3.1 is not the best epistemic
principle that can be

gotten from 02.12.

We seek evidence for intrinsic goodness which
can be

at least as secure epi stemical
ly as the belief that the thing in ques-

tion is

i

ntr i ns ic al

1

y good can be.

I

do not see how to demonstrate

this, but it seems clear that the self-evidence of the relevant
require-

ment cannot be as well warranted as the intrinsic goodness alone might
be.

For the former seems to depend on evidence for the intrinsic good-

ness and for the presence of the requirement and its self-evidence.
Also, recognizing that approval

out of regard for intrinsic goodness is

called for seems to depend upon having used other evidence to discern
the intrinsic goodness.

So

not be our means for gaining

it

i

appears that seeing the requirement could
nitial warrant for the intrinsic
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goodness. ?
E3.2

I

S

think we do better by
turning our attention to:

contemplatively approving of

p

out of regard for p's intrin-

sic goodness tends to
confirm that p is intrinsically
good.

any case, the trouble attributed
to E3.2 below seems at least
as
serious a problem in the case
of E3.1, so we do Brentano no
disservice
by concentrating on E3.2.
E3.2 has the distinct advantage
that its justifying condition is plainly
capable of the highest possible degree
of
In

justification for S.

(Recall

that the approval is to be out of
regard

for what is taken to be p's
intrinsic goodness.)
We should note concerning E3.2
that its jusitfying condition uses

the very concept the application of
which it is to justify.

once again the unwholesome spectre of
circularity.

That raises

But use of the con-

cept in question is not an objectionable
feature of justification principles.

For instance, the use of the concept of being
an ovoid egg is

innocuous here:
(a)

All

eggs in

a

large random sample being ovoid tends to confirm

that all eggs are ovoid.
For another example, that

itself.

I

seem to see something white justifies

Indeed, the fact of self-justification shows that some justi-

fies flagrantly require

the justified to be evidence for the justifies

So the circularity that ruins an analysis is not an objectionable trait

here.

The most similar feature that

j_s

a

flaw in an epistemic principle

is its presupposing other evidence for the justified of at least equal

strength to the evidence it is supposed to supply.
that spoils this:

That is the fault
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(b)

Someone knowing that some
suits are worsted wool tends to
confirm that some suits are
worsted wool.

E3.2 does not give any sign
of being flawed in that way.
On the other hand,

whenever

(believed) intrinsic goodness,

intrinsically good.

evidently so.
E3.3

i

approves of

p

out of regard for p's

thinks of the proposition that

p

is

And it seems that intrinsic goods
might be self-

That is, perhaps:

If p is

intrinsically good, then possibly, for some

self-evident for
If

S

S

S

that

p

S,

it is

is intrinsically good.

E3.3 is true, then we ought to doubt that
pleasure is playing any ep-

stemical ly useful

role in E3.2.

p's intrinsic goodness

self.

S

may be getting all the evidence for

from the thought that

p

is intrinsically good it-

Pleasure would then have no greater epistemic
function in E3.2

than it does in:
(c)

Jones taking pleasure in his seeming to see the door
closed
tends to confirm that the door is closed.

Clearly, the seeming to see supplies all the epistemic oomf in
(c).

We

can tell that this is so by noting the truth of (c), the falsity of:
(d) Jones taking

pleasure in the door being closed tends to con-

firm that the door is closed.,
and that the justifier in (c)

is no better support for the door being

closed than is the seeming to see by itself, i.e.,:
(e)

Jones seeming to see the door closed tends to confirm that the
door is closed.
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^

H° W anal ° 90US are E3 ‘ 2

ing,8

I

E3.3 to (c) and

find E3.2 and E3.3 equally
plausible.

(

e)7

Roughly speak-

No consideration seems

to differentiate their credibility
decisively.

If

there is no such con-

sideration, then however reasonable
E3.2 is, it does not give evidence
that pleasure plays a more
important role in the discovery of
intrinsic
goodness than it does in the discovery
of closed doors.

(It should be

acknowledged that this epistemic
equivalence between E3.2 and E3.3 seems
subject to rough estimate only.
It is by no means obvious what,
if anything, satisfies either.

And this is so despite the fact
that neither

uses intolerably unclear terms.)
We must not conclude from this equivalence
that the pleasure in

E3.2 does not help to justify
to employ
E3.4

a

p

being intrinsically good.

That would be

principle relevantly like:

If A and B

epistemically supports

C to

exactly the same degree

as B does, then A does not support C.
To

see the error in E3.4 we need do no more than consider

both contains support for
dence that discounts

C

case where A

of the same strength as B, and contains evi-

For example, let A

B.

a

Jones seems to hear

=

door

a

close and seems to remember the expert telling him that if he seems to
see

a

door close, that is

door close; and

C

=

a

hallucination;

B

=

Jones seems to hear

a

A door is closed.

What we are entitled to say at this point about E3.2 and E3.3 is

that, given their equal

plausibility and the inclusion of

E 3.

3
'

s

evi-

dence in E3.2, we have no reason yet to believe that pleasure plays

significant role in the discovery of intrinsic goodness.

a

Pleasure would

9
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be shown to be of special help
in determining intrinsic
goodness if
pleasures not taken in consideration
of intrinsic goodness (i.e.,
pleasures not implying that one think
of p being intrinsically good) can
be
shown to give evidence for intrinsic
goodness.
Then there would be

nothing analogous to (d)'s falsehood
to complete the parallel to the ex-

hibition of the irrelevance of the
pleasure in (c).

Charles Baylis has

offered an epsitemic principle of just
the right sort.

C.

Baylis's Criterion

Baylis seeks an "identifying property" for intrinsic
goodness:

...

a

discoverable characteristic the presence of which is

a

reli-

able sign of the intrinsic goodness of that thing.
Here is his proposal:

When we judge certain things, e.g., pleasant experiences, to
be in-

trinsically good, the best initial evidence we could have,

I

submit,

is that we find ourselves prizing things of that kind, i.e., liking,

approving, desiring, preferri ng and commending them, for their own
qualities (rather than for their relations to other valuable things)
in circumstances where to the best of our searching knowledge we are

making no mistake in our cognition of them.
an initial

Such evidence gives us

probability that we thus prize is intrinsically good

If "the best of our

JO

searching knowledge" can include evidence

about the intrinsic value status of the thing in question, then it may
be the "circumstances" rather than the "prizing" that does the epistemic

n s

1

57

This is clearly not the
intended interpretation.

that the principal
(i)

)

i

suggests

s

sorts of errors to avoid
are to be evaded by:

attending explicitly to the
thing's believed extrinsic value
and discounting

( 1

Bayl

focusi

9

it,

carefully on the thing and other
cases of the same

sort, and

(ni) avoiding risky perceptual
conditions like being tired or
drunk,
Let us call

tions."

a

impassioned or prejudiced.^

sincere effort to do these things
"taking normal

precau-

We do not have to find out anything
about intrinsic value to

take normal

precautions; we will

our searching knowledge."

let doing so constitute "the best of

And we will

avoid approving and other sorts

of "prizing" that imply believed goodness
by appealing to liking only.

Finally, we will

use the concept of being pleasing in itself
from Chap-

ter 11^2 as our rendition of
ties."

Then Bayl

E3.5

p

1

i

s

".

.

.

liking

.

.

.

for their own quali-

view becomes:

being pleasing in itself to someone who is taking normal

precautions tends to confirm that
E3.5 is unacceptable.

Its justifying

be met by intrinsic goods in particular.

p

is

intrinsically good.

condition has no tendency to

A survey of the things that

people spontaneously like would largely turn up undisputed intrinsic

neutrals such as the rustling of autumn leaves, tickling sensations, the

appearance of

a

flawless, polished chromium surface in bright light, and

the feeling of extreme dizziness.

These neutrals are at least as apt to

be pleasing in themselves as intrinsic goods, and taking normal

.
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precaut ions doss not affsct
that

see no variation on E3.5 that
does

I

appreciably better.
Someone might ask, "Would not

a

closer look at what people in

these conditions find pleasing
in itself reveal that it is
really the

ple asure taken
all

rather than its object?

,

Hence, are not these examples

cases where the hedonist's view of
intrinsic goods is confirmed?"
My best efforts at introspecting
the phenomena in question tell me

that this objection is in error.

fresh ripe peaches.

experience which
makes likely.
experiences.

I

I

For instance,

I

like the taste of

That taste is an elaborate gustatory
and olfactory
find

I

do not like because of anything it causes
or

enjoy eating peaches because that brings on
pleasant

But the taste itself does not please me
in virtue of any

extrinsic consideration--! just like it.
Perhaps Baylis was misled into thinking that E3.4 has
merit by an

ambiguity in "pleasant experience."

The things that satisfy E3.5's jus-

tifying condition are called "pleasant experiences" because they
are experiential

states in which pleasure is taken.

They are objects of plea-

sure at times, and, signi ficantly, those times include any occasion on

which E3.5

s

justifying condition is met.

On

all

such occasions the

other rel evant sense of "pleasant experience" also applies to something
in the vici nity--the prizings themselves can be called that, too.

But

they are not what is then satisfying E3.5.

a

"reliable sign" that something is

a

Doing that is not even

"pleasant experience" in this latter

sense (nor that it is anything else credibly taken as intrinsically
good)
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D.

Removing Remain ing Apparent
Disanaloqies

We can move closer than E3.5
gets to the justifying condition
in
E3.2 without using something
that involves thinking of
p being intrin-

sically good, thus strengthening
the analogy to the case of the
closed
door.

We can try:

E3.6

p

being contemplatively approved by
someone out of regard for

some believed feature of
p or other tends to confirm that
p is
i

ntrinsical ly good.

E3.6 is no better than E3.5, though.

course of making

a

Smith saying "Please" in the

request can be contemplatively approved as
good man-

ners; Robinson using dynamite as an example
of an explosive can be con-

templatively approved as

a

good example.

The only ways to modify E3.6

that seem better than it bring back the thought
of p's intrinsic good-

ness as the basis for the approval
rel evance of pleasure in

(c)

So

.

the analogy to the epistemic ir-

seems to be further borne out.

A last putative disanalogy between pleasure in
the intrinsic good-

ness evidence principle E3.2 and pleasure in the door closure
principle
(c)

should be discussed.

There is

a

lingering temptation to find E3.2

better than E3.3 (while there is no such temptation to prefer
(e)).

I

think that intuition can be explained in

sure no evidential

a

(c)

to

way that gives plea-

role in learning of intrinsic goodness.

Contempla-

tive approval out of regard for intrinsic goodness is closely correlated
with focusing upon and attending to the proposition that the thing in

question is

i

ntri nsical ly good in search of intrinsic goodness-

conferring features of it.

This correlated concentration may provide
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evidence for p's intrinsic
goodness which is superior to that
provided
by simply thinking of
p being intrinsically good in
some casual fashion.
But even if so, this is certainly
not evidence from pleasure itself.
can replicate any such advantage
of E3.2 with:
E3.7

S

giving careful consideration to
whether

good while taking normal

p

We

is intrinsically

precautions and believing

p

to be in-

trinsically good on the basis of such
reflections tends to

confirm that

p

is

intrinsically good.

E3.7 makes no use of pleasure.

Yet it achieves the focusing effect in

question at least as well as E3.2.

If we

use E3.7 instead of E3.3

as

the analog to (d) in the case of the
closed door, the analogy seems complete.

The conclusion that pleasure in E3.2 is
epi stemical ly superflu-

ous now looks inescapable.

0

61

Notes to Chapter III

J Franz
(New York:
p.

22.

Brentano, The Ori gin of Our Knowledge
of Right and Wrong
Humanities Press 1969), E. Schneewind
and Chisholm, trans.

2 Charles
Bay 1
494-495.
pp.
3 See

Note 12.

ii

i

s,

"Grading, Values and Choice," Mind 67
(1958),

the Introduction above. at the beginning
of section

44See the Brentano citations in sections
above.
5 Brentano,

p.

A,

B

C,

and

and C of Chapter
r

22.

6See Chapter II above, sections

C

and D.

^ it might be thought that, if we
need evidence for intrinsic
goodness before we can see the requirement, then the
requirement could
not be self-evident.
But not so.
If the intrinsic goodness is selfevident by D2.8, then so might be the requi rement as a whole,
even
though it depends on something other than itself (i.e., its
entailment
that p is intrinsically good) for evidence of p's intrinsic goodness.

8 See section D
below for a modified version of E3.2 that may be
more reasonably held to be epi stemical ly equivalent to E3.3.
9 Baylis,
1

1

11

bi d

.

,

p.

493.

pp. 494-495.

Ibid., p. 495

12 See Chapter II, D2.2 and Note 9.

*

CHAPTER

iv

PLEASURE AND THE POSSESSION
OF INTRINSIC GOODNESS
This chapter has two major
parts.

detail

problems that arise in formulating

tic theory.

a

I

discuss in some

clear and thorough hedonis-

That part naturally divides
into (a) problems in identify-

ing the hedonists'
(b)

the first.

In

basic bearers of value (sections A
and C below) and

problems in distributing the proper
values to indefinitely complex

states of affairs on the basis of any
given identification of basics
(section

B

below).

The second main section of the
chapter concerns se-

lected objections to any version of
hedonism.

tion

below) is an argument by Brentano for the
claim that pleasures

D

cannot be the only intrinsic goods.
Broad

s

The other objections considered are

contention that malice shows not

good (section

E

all

pleasures are intrinsically

below), and Moore's beauty objection (section

A.

F

below).

First Attempts to Formulate Hedonism

What is hedonism?
succinct formulation:
which doctrine is that?
pl

The first objection (sec-

That seems easy to answer.

We can use Moore's

"Pleasure alone is [intrinsically] good."!
It

But

seems to say that there is one item--

easure--whi ch is the sole thing having positive intrinsic value.

Surely, though, hedonists wish to hold that any of the many pleasing ex-

periences is intrinsically good.

That suggests the statement:

only pleasant experiences are intrinsically good
right either.

.

2

and

That is not quite

For many persons, tasting an ice-cream sundae is
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All

a

,
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pleasant experience.
events of tasting.

Yet hedonists do not attribute
intrinsic value to

They hold that the pleasure of
the taste is the in-

trinsic good in the experience,
not the taste that is its object.

But

still, every case of taking pleasure
is to count, not just the pleasure

taking relation itself.

So

instances of taking pleasure— which we shall

understand here to be states of affairs—
are good candidates for the

hedonist's bearers of intrinsic goodness.
ing:

All

We can put the view by say-

and only pleasure-states are intrinsically
good.

not leave the formulation that vague.
to "pleasure-states."

We have to attach

But we must

clear meaning

a

(The "hedonism" in question is not to be confused

with an implausible doctrine about America's sun-and-fun
spots— FI orida
California, and Hawaii.)
D4»l

p

Here is

proposal:

a

is a pleasure-state = df necessarily, if
p obtains, then

someone is pleased.
D4.1

captures all the episodes that

ment of others.

a

hedonist wants, and

a

rich assort-

For now, 3 we can assume that hedonists would be after

states like:
(a) Jones being pleased,

or
(b) Jones being pleased about Smith's good fortune,

or perhaps
(c) Jones being

level

6

pleased to intensity

5

about Smith's good fortune.

D4.1, though, also embraces states such as:

for 4 seconds at quality
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(d)

Jones being pleased and
Smith being displeased,

(e) Jones being pleased
during a bowling escapade,

and
(f)

(d)

Someone being pleased.

is no hedonist's idea of
an intrinsic good;

counted intrinsically good by

a

(e) and

(f) mig ht be

hedonist, but only by deriving their
in-

trinsic value from the fundamental

bearers of hedonistic value that we

now seek to capture, the
"pleasure-states."
A better attempt to select
out the right states is:

04,2

gjs
x

a

pleasure-state

= df (i

possibly, there is exactly one

)

such that necessarily,
p obtainss iff (a) x is pleased, and

(b)

necessarily, for all q, if

pleased, then

q

implies

p.

strictly implies that

q

(In other words,

p

implies

x is
a

cer-

tain person to be pleased, and anything
that implies that person to be pleased implies p.)

One counterexample to D4.2 is:
(g)

Jones being pleased or

7

plus

5

equaling 75.

This objection seems surmountable by appeal

volvement. 4

to Chisholm's concept of in-

Intuitively, what we want here is the narrowest state of

affairs attributing pleasure to Jones.

That seems to be the one which,

unlike (g), is involved in all the rest that make that attribution:

D4«3

p

is a

pleasure-state

such that necessarily,
(b)

for all

involves p.

q,

= df.

p

Possibly, there is exactly one

obtains iff (a)

x

x

is pleased, and

if q strictly implies that x is pleased, then q

:
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D4.3 achieves its intended
objective oniy if
metaphysical

proposition is true.

a

certain fairiy dubious

Perhaps there are "individual
esiff necessarily, x alone
in-

satiates e).

Any entity would have
.any of these.

For example, Jones

would have one we can call
"iel" and the property of
being the iel and
such that there might be
wolves (or, in the unlikely
event that iel is
just that property, being the
iel or not such that
there might be
wolves).
Now, for any individual
essence of Jones, iej, necessarily,
if
Jones is pleased, then the iej
is pleased.
Thus if there _[s a single
proposition involved in each that
implies him to be pleased, then Jones
must have a "core essence": c is
a core essence of x iff (i)
c is an
individual essence of

x

and (ii) necessarily, if there are
S, p, and F,

such that S thinks of
p and p strictly implies x to have F, then
S

grasps c.
physical

That each individual

has

a

proportion implied by 04.3.

core essence is the dubious metaFor if not, then there are two

propositions such that each attributes being
pleasing to the one who has

what is in fact an individual essence of Jones,
while neither involves
the other.

Should we press on in our search for
pi

eas ure-states

complaint:

?

Suppose

It

might seem

a

a

rigorous account of

misguided project.

you tell us just which are the

What good will that be in formulating hedonism?

Consider this

1

pi

easure-states.

Presumably, we will be

offered
(H)

p

is

intrinsically good iff

p

is a

1

pleasure-state.
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The trend exemplified in
D4.1-D4.3 tells us that this
will be a theory
of nearly nugatory interest.
Think of what we want a theory
of intrin
sic value for.
At least, we want it
to provide a value rating
of alternatives for the sake of a thorough
formulation of utilitarianism.
But
any half-decent formulation
of such a theory-Fel dman'
s MO. Bergstrom's
T4--requires evaluating such things
as the causal consequences
of whole
courses of action or whole possible
worlds.
H rules all such things
to
be worthless!"

That vigorously advanced objection
is not entirely lacking in rational

force.

But it is not at all

clear that the hedonist must assign

intrinsic goodness to complex states of
affairs in order to rank them on

hedonistic principles.

There might be

a

in terms of pleasure-states "contained"

good way to explain the ranking
in such wholes.

This would be

a

complicated business, no doubt, in the case of
some of the purposes we
would like

a

value theory to serve.

istic theory of which actions are, on

agent's best interest.

For example, we might want
a

a

hedon-

given agent's evidence, in that

That would require appeal

to the hedonistic

value of what the agent's evidence attests to being the outcome
of what

that evidence purports to be the agent's available acts.
will

Such outcomes

ordinarily include ineliminable disjunctions such as:
(h)

Jones being amused or bemused.

Since the evidence in some cases does not determine which of (h)'s dis-

juncts will obtain, (h) itself must be evaluated.

Unlike conjunctions

involving pleasure-states, there is no manifest promising sense to be

made of such states "containing" pleasure-states that "sum" to the
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hedonistic value of the
whole,

How, then, can hedonism be
expanded to

cover that sort of territory?
Recent philosophical
developments give grounds for hope
about the
pleasure-state approach to these
things.
Warren quinn initiated the
work.
His "Theories of Intrinsic
Value" offers a means to assign
the
"night" intrinsic value to
complex states on the basis of
pre-determiend
evaluations of "basic" or "atomic"
ones.5 Edward 01dfield provided
a
much improved version of Quinn's
theory in "An Approach to a Theory
of
Intrinsic Value. "6

That work seems to supply just what
is needed

here- -a way to generate values for
indefinitely complex states out of

the values for pleasure-states.

As will

be seen though, even Oldfield's

development of the theory is not satisfactory
as

it stands.

The order

of business here, then, is to examine
that work, see whether the mechanism for assigning value can be perfected,
then see whether there are

ways to explicate

pleasure-state" that allow various versions of

hedonism to "plug into" the resulting machinery.

B.

I

think

I

The Qui nn-01 dfi el d Approach

cannot improve upon Oldfield's summary of Quinn's view:

[H]is theory is based on
No basic

a

primitive predicate 'basic proposition.'

proposition entails any other basic proposition.

Basic

propositions come in families, that is, sets whose members are mutually exclusive but jointly exhaustive.

ferent to

a

A proposition is not

indif-

family of basics iff it is compatible with some members

and not with others.

On the basis of the notion of indifference,
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value constituents are assigned
to every proposition.

— 1tuent

A value con -

0f a P r °P° si tion
p is a conjunction of propositions
which

first, is compatible with

every family to which

p

is

and

p

second, contains one member from

not indifferent.

Propositions which have

more than one value constituent are
indeterminate
sitions are

determ^^

The intrinsic value of

calculated at

a

world.

at w = 0.

p

is true at w,

If

If

p

is not true at w,

All

.

a

other propo-

determinate

is

p

its intrinsic value

its intrinsic value at w is equal
to

the sum of the intrinsic values of the
basic propositions which are

conjuncts of that value constituent of

p

which is true at w

Quinn's characterization of which are to be "basic"
is

promising:

individual

A basic

proposition

"

pi

.

.

locates

J

propositions

specific sentient

a

along an evaluatively relevant dimension such as
happiness,

virtue, wisdom, etc. ^
ing as

".

.

easure- states.

That sounds like just what we have been seek"

We will

these really are, 9 and we will

leave aside the question of what

follow Quinn and Oldfield in taking ex-

pressions such as "J5" and "J-8" to abbvreviate basics of five units of
positive and eight units of negative intrinsic value respectively.
How is Quinn's theory supposed to work?
(j)

J-l

Consider:

and K2.

First we must find the families to which (j) is not indifferent.
lies, according to Quinn, are sets such as the J's

=

[

Fami-

J-2, J-l, JO,

Jl, J2,..., J does not exist (this last member to ensure that the J's

are exhaustive )].

A little thought enables us to see that

ferent to all families except the J's and the K's.

(j)

is

indif-

We are to take it
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that the one member of the J's with which
J-l is compatible
(Recall

that families have mutually exclusive
members.)

is J-l.

Thus it can be

seen that the value constituent of
(j) is (j) itself, that (j) is de-

terminate, and that iv(j)=l, which is intuitively
right.
Things quickly go very bad, however.

Consider:

(k) J1 or K2.
(l

(k)

the
is.

)

Someone

2.

and (1) are indifferent to every family,
J

s,

(k)

is compatible with

all

for example, since it can be true when just its second
disjunct

So (k) and

(1)

are determinate.

The sum of the (vacuous) conjunc-

tion of their value constituents is thus 0--nowhere near their
intuitive

intrinsic value.
Oldfield points out these defects and develops
not subject to them.

(i)

If

p

is basic,

(ii)

if

p

is basic*,

(iii) if

S

is a

p

:

is basic*;

p's negation is basic*;

set of basic* propositions and C, the conjunct-

ion of the members of S
(iv)

theory that is

He begins with the basics, but he also appeals to

the much broader class of the basic*s
D4.4

a

i

s

contingent, then

C

is basic*;

nothing else is basic*

Oldfield then constructs

notion of "irrelevance," patterned after

a

Quinn's indifference:

D4.5

p

is

irrelevant

=

df.

pendent of every basic*

P

is contingent and

(logically)

inde-

.
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The irrelevant propositions are supposed
to be those that are without

evaluative content. 12

"The next task is t0 say what i$ the
class Qf

basic propositions in terms of which the
intrinsic value of
tion should be calculated at
D4 * 6

b is 3

a

world. "13

minimal set for

p

a

proposi-

Here we have the proposal:

in w

(

"Mi n(b,p,w"

)

=

df

(i)

b

is a

set of basics true in w; and (ii) there
is an irrelevant, c,

such that (a) c is true in w, and (b) the
conjunction of

c

and

the members of b entails p; and (iii) there is
no proper subset of b and an irrelevant which is true in w which
satisfy
(ii). 14

Let us look at D4.6 in operation.

things are simple enough.

Consider

blue, and M2 for good measure.
fies D3(i).

a

With respect to (k) and (1)

world, wl, where K2 and the sky is

What is Mi

n

(

b

,

(

k

)

,w) ?

Well, [K2] satis-

The sky being blue can be seen to be an irrelevant.

Its

conjunction with K2 entails (k), and no proper subset of [k2] conjoined
to any irrelevant does

so.

soning, Mi n([K2],

)

(

1

)

,wl

So Min

(

[K2]

,

(

k

) ,

wl

And by parallel

) .

rea-

Now let us look at another sort of case:
(m)
In

(K2 and the sky is blue)

or (J1 and grass is green)

this case, the true irrelevant for D4 . 6 ( i

i )

must be chosen with care.

For no conjunction of basics alone entails (m).
being blue for c.

But we have it,

so

(m)

In

wl we need the sky

seems to go through all

The principle of evaluation offered is:
(**)

For any world, w, and any proposition,

intrinsic value of

p

in w is equal

p,

true in w, the

to the sum of the

right.
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intrinsic values of the members of the
union of all the minimal
sets for p in
(

)

iv(k)w2
(k)

=

has its peculiarities.

and, following

sets for

(**), we sum the values of the members of

their union to get iv(k)w2.
powerful

As a world, w2, where J1 and K2,

This is because both [K2] and [Jl] are
minimal

3.

in w2,

wJ6

This result seems at variance with the

intuition that the intrinsic value of

a

state is

a

value that

the state guarantees in any world where it occurs--a
value it has necessarily.

offers

Oldfield may not share this intuition. 16
a

i

n

any event, he

principle for "absolute" (i.e., non-world varying) intrinsic

value that can be generalized to:
A IV

The absolute intrinsic value of
(i)

if

p

p

=

has world relative values for both sides of 0, then

0;

(ii)

if not, and

has

p

a

world relative value as close to

and any that it has, then
(iii) otherwise undefined

AIV does yield iv(k)=l.
(n)

people -1.

has that value;

J?

Unfortunately, though, it determines

Tom and Tom alone

to have 0 intrinsic value.

p

0

1

Consider w3 where (n) is true and nine other

What is (n)'s minimal

set in w3?

It

must be the set con-

taining the basic for each of the ten people in w3, and the (basic) negative existentials ("NE's") for each other possible person.
set,

Only that

together with an irrelevant (any irrelevant truth of w3), fits the

requirements on

b

in D4.6.

(Note that nothing implying Tom's uniqueness
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is irrelevant.)
will

iv(n)

Thus it appears that, by (**), iv(n)w3

=

-8.

Since (n)

also have positive values, by AIV we
get the unfortunate result:
= 0.

Concerning the intrinsic value assignment of -8
to (n) in w3, Oldfield offers an ingenious argument (attributed
to Jon RuttenburglS) in

defense of it.

assumes the principle that the world relative
intrin-

It

sic value of necessary equivalents must be the
same.

cept of (varying) world relative intrinsic value,

assess that assumption.

I

Lacking the condo not know how to

Anyway, were the argument sound, it would move

me to either alter AIV in order to salvage the intuitive
(absolute) in-

trinsic value for (n) of

1,

or revise things earlier on to avoid such

relative values as -8 for any equivalent of (n).

Since

I

think that ac-

ceptable (absolute) intrinsic values can be obtained only when we revise both some preliminary material

First
(o)

a

preliminary difficulty for (**).

second conjunct is

set for (o)
_not

in any world.

irrelevant.

shall

do.

Consider:

It

is

That is because (o)'s

incompatible with the NE for

Moreover, there is no set of basics which, together with an ir-

relevant, entails that conjunct.

(Initially likely candidates for the

irrelevant typically are implied by some basic*.)
award (o) the value
Since
by appeal

I

M10 and Alfred being medium-sized.

There is no minimal

Alfred.

and AIV, that is what

I

0,

So

(**) seems to

which is clearly inappropriate.

want to have (o) receive the (absolute) intrinsic value 10

to "minimal

minimal

sets,"

so to

basics out of some of the minimals for (o).

speak,
I

I

must get the Alfred

think the best way to
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proceed is to render the second conjunct
of (o) irrelevant by altering
D4.5:

D4,5a

£J.

S

irrelevant = df.

is contingent, and
p is independent

p

of every basic* which is independent of
the conjunction of

every proposition to the effect that
vidual

certain possible indi-

a

exists.

D4.5a makes Alfred being medium- si zed irrelevant.
existential

That negative

basic* to which it is not D4.5-irrel evant is not
logically

independent of the conjunction of exi stenti

al s

,

since of course that

conjunction implies it to be false.
What are we to do about things like (n)?
by finding
(r)

a

I

think we should begin

way to adjust AIV to make (n) worth 1, make

Exactly two people-5 or exactly three people-3

worth -9 (its

di sj

unct-cl osest-to-0

1

s

value), and leave without absolute

value states such as
(s)

Someone being happy to some degree or other. 19

Such ratings would appeal

to one sensible set of intuitions about the

intrinsic value of complex states.
I

that.

think there is

a

way to build upon Oldfield's work to accomplish

Notice that there are worlds where the minimal

just [Tl, the NE for each other possible individual].
that Tl is

a

member of every minimal

there is no basic which is
in the

a

set for (n).

member of each minimal

set

for (n) is

Notice further

But also notice that

set for (r).

Even

case of (r), however, there will be various 5-apiece pairs and

-3-apiece trios (filled out by NE

1

s

for all

other individuals) that are

;
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minimal
mal

set

sets for

(

r)

and such that no subset of any of
these is

for (r) anywhere.

values in them.

All

And those are the minimal

a

mini-

sets with the right

this suggests that we should make use of this
con-

cept:
D4.7

is a least minimal
s

is a minimal

is a minimal

set

set for

least minimal

a

w such that
s

set for p in any world.

worlds, it is not least minimal
[Tl, the NE's] is a

df (i) there is

=

for p in w; and (ii) no proper subset of

Though [K-10, Tl, the NE's] is

(n)

p

a

minimal

set for (n).

for (n) in some

For the minimal

proper subset of it.

set for r, the only minimal

set

set for

[J5, L5, the NE's]

is a

sets for (r) other than itself

whose membership it exhausts also contain some other basic.

So

far so

good.
By appeal

to D4.7 we gain the following notion of (absolute)

intrinsic value:
AIV2 The absolute intrinsic value of
(i)

if there is an

least minimal
p

(ii)

i

s

cl ose to

n

set
0,

such that

n

=

p

=

the sum of the values for

for p which is such that no such sum for

then

n

otherwise undefined.

AIV2 yields in the case of (r) the (absolute) intrinsic value -9.
To

see this, note that least minimal

NE's], [L-3, M-3,

sets for (r)

N-3, the NE's], and [J-3,

M-3,

include [J5, K5, the
L-3,

the NE's].

So no

sum of the values of the members of (r)'s least minimals can be closer
to 0 than -9.

a

:
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This accords with

a

value disjunctions have.

certain conservative intuition about how much
But it is simple enough to accommodate the in-

tuition that states like (r) are worthless because there
is no value,
positive or negative, that they guarantee.

We make further adjustment

in AIV

AIV3
(i)

The absolute intrinsic value of
if there is an

n

such that

n

p

=

is positive

(negative) and

no positive (negative) sum of the values of the conjuncts

of

a

least minimal

set for

p

is closer to 0, and none is

below (above) 0; then n;
(ii)

if, in the case of p, there are two sums of values that

satisfy the positive and negative versions of A I V 3 ( i

)

re-

spectively, then 0;
(iii) otherwise undefined.

AIV3

assigns 0 to (r) and its ilk, since having least minimals

that straddle 0 brings AIV3(ii) into play.
fined.

The reason concerns

a

But it leaves e.g.

(s)

unde-

problem with applying the "guaranteed

value" intuition to such cases.

It

might be that for each world there

is some smallest increment of pleasure which it is pyschol ogical ly pos-

sible for the creatures of that world to experience.

plausible that there is

a

necessary minimum.

So the hedonistic world-

relative intrinsic values for (s) are as close to
never

0.

But it is not

0 as can be,

though

This might inspire attributing 0 intrinsic value to (s), al-

beit with misgivings in light of the fact that (s) guarantees better

than

0

(perhaps with consolation derived from there being nothing better
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than

0

that (s) guarantees).

But such an attribution is not even that

satisfactory in the case of:
(t)

(t) 's

Two people being pleased to some degree or other.

values approach

0 as

a

limit, too.

But there would seem to be

twice as much hedonistic intrinsic good in (t).
derive from the lack of

descending series.
(u)

a

full

Such a judgment might

appreciation of the nature of infinite

But the going gets very tough in the face of:

Someone being pleased to some degree or other and someone else
being twice as pleased.

(u) 's

world relative values get just as low as (s)'s, despite its virtu-

ally asserting itself to be better from the hedonistic point of view.
In

light of such examples, some will

prefer to leave such states without

(absolute) intrinsic values, in the manner of AIV3.
I

0.

I

prefer to assign all those states the absolute intrinsic value

believe that the misgivings in question finally do just rest upon

the manifest scope ambiguity in "guaranteed value," and that the right
reading is "the value the state guarantees," not "the state guarantees
some value."

To satisfy my

preference here we must have

a

final

formu-

lation of AIV:
AIV4
(i)

The absolute intrinsic value of
if there is an

n

such that

n

p

=

is positive

(negative) and no

positive (negative) sum of the values of the conjuncts of
least minimal

set for

(above) 0; then n;

p

is closer to 0, and none is below

a
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(ii)

if,

in the case of p, there are two sums
of values that satis-

fy the positive and negative versions
of AIV4 (

respectively,

i )

then 0;
(iii)

if there is an

n

such that the least minimals for

as a limit, and no least minimal

for

approach

is nearer 0,

and none

p

p

n

is on the other side of 0; then n.

C.

If

Hedonism Formulated

AIV4 determines the value of complex states, which are the
hed-

onist's basics?

We would like to accomplish two goals with our basics:

First, to make AIV4 work right, conjunctions of basics, in conjunction

with irrelevants, must imply every state having hedonistic value.
ond, we want the assorted versions of hedoni sm--e.g.

,

those that do, and

those that do not, recognize "quality" differences among
be stated readily within the scheme.

The first goal

mentioned, it may be that for each world there is
least interval

of time and intensity of pleasure.

a

pi

(v)

(v)

Thus

a

easures--to

first:

As

already

physically necessary
Maybe not.

any case, it is not credible that there are certain minimal
that hold for all worlds.

Sec-

But in

intervals

difficulty arises when we consider:

Smith experiencing pleasure of

2

units intensity.

short for one of the following:

is

(v‘) Smith experiencing pleasure of two units of intensity now or

then , for some contextually definite time),
1

(v

')

Smith experiencing pleasure of two units intensity for some
interval

of time or other.
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Since pleasure must take time,

(v‘

)

(v") are

and

in the same boat with

some intensity or other" states--either
intrinsically worthless or con-

founding to the guiding intuition of guaranteed
value.
By the same token,
i

sm,

from the vantage point of "qualitative"
hedon-

states such as
(w)

Smith experiencing pleasure of

2

units intensity for

2

seconds

also guarantee vanishingly little intrinsic goodness
(except in the dubious circumstance that there is some least unit of
"quality").

And we

should not assume that hedonists can consistently recognize
only intensity, duration, and "quality" as independent, evaluatively
relevant,

variable properties of pleasures.

One way in which criticisms to the

effect that hedonism values too much can be blunted is to factor in an

admirability rating for pleasures.

It

can be said with prima facie con-

sistency that e.g. detached, intellectual enjoyment of sadistic acts and
of magnanimous deeds, of equal

quantity and quality, differ so much in

admirability that the former is intrinsically inferior to the latter.
Perhaps still other parameters must be admitted; perhaps intensity and

duration tell the whole story.

How can we be sure that, in any case our

basics will fit properly into the rest of the theory?
Well, if

I

had some version of hedonism to advocate, it would be

sufficient to identify its basics.

But an adequate defense of a parti-

cular version of hedonism is the topic of some other dissertation.
Here,

I

am restricted to attempting to say which are the basics relative

to any given version of hedonism.
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Recall

that in section A we left off our try
at isolating the

"pleasure-states" with the problem of the core
essence (an individual

essence of
ual

x

which is thought of whenever anyone thinks
of any individ-

essence of x, speaking roughly).

am now prepared to hold that

I

core essences are worse than doubtful --they are
lacking entirely.
we must acknowledge such individual

essences of

A.

N.

Whitehead as being

Russell's co-author of Principia Mathematica in
@ (where
world), and being the author of Process and Reality
in

For

@.

names this
And there is

nothing peculiar to Whitehead that must be thought of when
thinking of
each.

So Whitehead has no core essence.

Because of this consideration,

D4.1-D4.3 approach.

In

think that we must abandon the

I

fact, the only way

I

see to turn brings us back

into the region of the metaphysically dubious.

I

think we have to look

to what Herbert Heidelberger calls "singular propositions."

The doc-

trine of singular propositions is the view that, for every property (relation) and object(s), there is

a

proposition--a singular one--which is

believed just in case the proerty (relation) is attributed de re to the

objects in
fill

a

the bill

given order.

If there are such

as pleasure-states.

As we have seen, each basic

propositions, some of them

But which ones?
for a version of hedonism has to spell

out how the pleasure rates with respect to each factor that the version

deems

a

contributor to intrinsic value.

Otherwise the state does not

imply the presence of any positive quantity of intrinsic value, by the

standard of the version in question.

hedonism appeal to?

Which factors can versions of

Since each is to give us quantities of intrinsic
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value that pleasures introduce, each must
identify magnitudes that pertain in some way to pleasure, and tell

what function of those magni-

us

tudes yields the intrinsic value of the
pleasure.
cal

quantitative" hedonism as

I

For example, classi-

understand it is the view that the in-

trinsic value of an instance of someone taking
pleasure in something is
the product of the intensity and the duration of
the pleasure.

This example lands us in the middle of several

controversi es.

They might repay detailed discussion, but it does not
belong here.

Yet

if only one variety of hedonism is coherent, much of
this discussion has

been superfluous.

I

think that is not the situation;

I

shall

try to say

just enough here about the controversies to make that opinion
credible.
The "intensity" of

a

pleasure might be taken to refer to the felt

vigor of the sensation or other mental
I

think

a

event that gives rise to it.

version of hedonism that assigns

a

But

signficant independent con-

tribution to intrinsic value by that variable is beyond belief.

It

overrates the fairly modest joys of jackhammeri ng and underrates the

considerable pleasure that can be got from the feeling of
breeze.

Preferable is the view of

C.

D.

a

soft warm

Broad according to whom there

is a simple, directly apprehended magnitude--hedonic tone--present in

some degree whenever pleasure is taken. 20

when the pleasure is sens-

ory, we speak of this as "how good it feels (tastes, smells, etc.)";

when the pleasure is not primarily sensory, we speak of "how much we
like it."

This quality seems the most reasonable referent for the "in-

tensity" of the pleasure.
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Some have doubted that there can be
sity.

It

a

way to measure this inten-

seems that there might be, since we might
establish

a

corre-

lation of its degree with the strength of electrical
current in some
part of the brain or the like.

But

truth or coherence of an appeal

to this intensity turns on its being

I

see no reason to believe that the

measurabl e.
Mill

appears to have thought that the value of

a

pleasure also de-

pends upon an independent variable that he called "quality."

questions:

Is

that thought consistent with the position that only "more

pleasure" supplies more positive intrinsic value?21

pleasure is its "quality"?
"quality" are brought in?

concern us only if
For unless

a

conditional

a

view is

And is it still
It

a

a

hedonism when differences of

certain sort of answer to the third

is correct.

version of hedonism only if it affirms the bi-

answer to that question is.
a

What feature of

seems to me that the first question should

in the first question,

would count as

Three

it does not matter to us what the

Similarly, only after we determine what

hedonistic theory can we see what can be consistently

taken as an intrinsic value determining "quality" difference.

is

What makes

a

uncontroversi

al

ure.

value theory hedonistic?
:

All

positive value is to be contributed by pleas-

That is too vague to get us far.

be used?

The following requirement

What facts about

a

pleasure can

Intuitively speaking, the intensity of the pleasure is okay;

the extent to which the society in which it is felt is just, is not
okay.

What is the difference?

tudes that

a

My hypothesis is that the only magni-

distinctively hedonistic theory of intrinsic goodness can

make relevant are experienced variables in pleasurable experiences.

Somewhat more precisely:

8
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D4 * 8

M is potentially hedoni stical ly significant

set,

df.

=

There is

a

of properties, each of which is necessarily
such that

S,

it is exemplified

iff someone exemplifies it, is aware of it,

and is pleased; and for some number, n, and duration,
d, the

degree of M is
each quality in

iff someone exemplifies, and is aware of,

n

S

during d, and some quality or other in

S

throughout d.
I

think that D4.8 sorts magnitudes appropriately.

the case of intensity,

S

For example, in

is the set containing just the quality which

some given degree of hedonic tone and

i

is a single moment.

is

For dura-

tion, the quality is that of taking pleasure in something, and the degree, M, equals the duration of

i.

The property of being pleased in

a

society having degree of justice M fails D4.8, since degree of justice

does not correlate with any experiential quality; society can be that

just while no one is aware of it.

The property of being pleased while

having existed for M seconds also does not pass D4.8.

qualities which are present just when
fied only when that person is

exclusions, but

I

a

a

No experiential

person is pleased are exempli-

given age.

I

like those inclusions and

do not claim that D4.8 is the only reasonable proposal

for potentially hedoni stical ly relevant magnitudes.
If D4.8

determines

a

is an acceptable account, what might be

pleasure's "quality"?

i

i

pi

easure--what the pleasure is

n--determi ne "quality" differences.

esteemed better than "bodily" ones.

magnitude that

Some passages in Util i tar an ism 2

suggest that differences in objects of

taken

a

It

"Intellectual" objects are

is not obvious what magnitude
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is intended.

A varying

intellectual

factor that D4.8 allows

a

hedonist

to count relevant is the degree of
concentration on the object of

pleasure. How intently we are attending to what
we are taking pleasure
in

is,

I

think, something we experience.

measure the degree of our intellectual
lectual

"quality" of the pleasure.

It

And it could be taken to

involvement, and thus the intelis, at any rate, a magnitude in

addition to intensity and duration that D4.8 allows
into account. 23

a

hedonist to take

And finally, concerning our first "quality" question,

if we say that intensity and duration together determine
"how much"

pleasure is had, then

a

hedonist can with consistency appeal to such

things as degree of concentration in denying that the better

a

pleasure

is, the more of it there must be.

As

see it, then,

I

a

full-blown version of hedonism must select

its magnitudes from the properties that satisfy D4.8.

And it must

choose its basics from these singular propositions:
D4.9

B

is a potential

df.

B

is

a

basic bearer of hedonic intrinsic goodness

singular proposition such that necessarily,

S

=

be-

lieves B iff there are degrees and potentially hedoni stical ly

significant magnitudes such that

S

attributes to someone the

property of entering into the pleasure taking relation to

those degrees of those magnitudes.
The magnitudes that are relevant for

a

version of hedonism are the ones

it deems independently to affect the intrinsic value of any potential

basic, i.e.:
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^*10

Ml-Mn

a re

the relevant magnitudes for version of
hedonism

=

V

df (i) Ml-Mn are potentially hedoni st ical
ly significant; and
(i)
x

according to

V,

for any potential

basic hedonistic bearers

and y, necessarily, if x is intrinsically better
than y,

then at least one of Ml-Mn has
y; and (iii) according to V,

tential

a

greater value for

x

than for

for each of Ml-Mn, there are po-

basic hedonistic bearers x and y such that x is in-

trinsically better than y, and

x

equals y for every other mag-

a

version of hedonism:

nitude from Ml-Mn.
Now we can identify the basics for
D4 .11

B

is a basic bearer of intrinsic goodness for version of

hedonism

=

V

df.

B

is a

potential basic bearer of hedonic

value that attributes values to exactly the relevant

magnitudes for
Finally,

a

full

V.

version of hedonism must say which function of its

relevant magnitudes gives the intrinsic values of its basics:
D4.12

F

intrinsic value function for version of hedonism

is the

df.

According to

that if

x

V

=

V,

the function, F(x, Ml,...Mn, y), is such

is a basic

for V attributing pleasure to someone to

degrees Ml-Mn of the magnitudes deemed hedoni stical ly relevant
by V, then y is the intrinsic value of x.

AIV4 will operate on the basics of

a

version and the values as-

signed by its basic intrinsic value function in yielding the intrinsic

values of the complex states of affairs.
ple to have

a

complete theory.

intri nsical ly bad basics.

Until

But it is not quite that sim-

We also have to be told which are the

now

I

have said nothing about pain
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here.

Traditionally, the doctrine that pleasure is
the only intrinsic

good has been paired with the view that pain
is the only intrinsic evil.
Yet it is obvious that the former does not
logically imply or analytic-

ally contain the latter (nor vice versa).

Thus it is intriguing to

speculate about the justification for this pairing.24
ness is our subject, however.

So here

utilization of the modified Qui nn-01 df i

I

intrinsic good-

confine myself to noting that

el d

machinery for assigning value

to complex states awaits an account of the basics bearing
intrinsic

di s-

val ue.25

D.

As

I

Brentano's Argument Against Hedonism

say, a thorough assessment of the many reasonable versions of

hedonism is

a

thesis-size undertaking by itself.

Three arguments af-

fecting the truth of any hedonism will be considered below.

The first,

by Brentano, is aimed at showing that if pleasure is intri nsical
ly good,

then so is something else.

I

take it up becuase

I

believe it is inter-

esting and deserves to be laid out more fully than it is in Brentano's
formulation.

The second argument we will consider is C. D. Broad's ob-

jection to the effect that the evil

of malice shows that all

hedonism count too much as intrinsically good.

forms of

And the third case is

Moore's example intended to show that hedonism, by leaving out beauty,

counts too little as intrinsically good.

An

accounting of the replies

available to the hedonist against the latter two objections goes
way toward exhibiting hedonism's strengths.

a

long

^
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Brentano's objection is modestly complicated.

is stated

It

in a

compressed fashion, which must be quoted in full:
To

or

feel
a

pleasure or delight is an emotional

act,

a

taking pleasure

loving; it always has an object, is necessarily

a

pleasure in

something which we perceive or imagine, have an
idea of.
ample, sensual

object.

pleasure has

a

For ex-

certain localized sense quality as its

Now if nothing other than pleasure could be
loved, this

would mean that every act of loving had an act of
loving as an object, but the beloved act of loving would have in turn
to be di-

rected upon an act of loving, and

so

forth ad infinitum .

No; in

order for pleasure to exist at all something other than pleasure
must be capable of being loved.
But it follows further that pleasure is not the only thing

worthy of love.

If it

were, any pleasure would be pleasure taken in

something unworthy of love and hence unworthy of being an object of
pleasure.

And in that case,

pleasure could scarcely be worthy of

love; the danger would be that nothing at all was worthy of love.

pleasure is

If

The best way

a

good, there must also be other goods.

see to proceed is to set up my reconstruction of

I

the argument right away, then discuss that.

clear enough what my textual basis is.

It

It

will

will,

I

believe, be

be helpful

to begin with

this abbreviation:
D8

S

is the sequence

df.

Sis

(of propositional

objects) for pleasure

P

=

an orderd set which is such that (i) the first mem-

ber, p of S

i

s

a

singular proposition consisting in an

)

37

individual

taking pleasure in something, and (ii) if

a

member of

S

singular proposition consisting in an individual
taking pleas-

is a

ure in something, then its successor is that in
which that member

states the individual

to be taking pleasure.

Brentano's argument .
(1)

For each pleasure, there is exactly one object in
which that pleasure is taken.

(2)

No pleasure can have a sequence having

no last member (i.e.,

"ad

infinitum ").
(3)

Each pleasure has

(4)

(x)

1

a

finitely long sequence. (1, 2)

if x is worthy of love, then pleasure taken in x is unworthy of

ove.

Suppose (5) Only pleasures are worthy of love.
(6)

Each pleasure is either pleasure taken in
in

(7)

something unworthy of love.

(x)

(4,

5,

is a pleasure,

if x

(x)

if x is

cluding
4 and
If

x

5)
a

pleasure, or pleasure

27

pleasure taken in

a

pleas-

6)

then the next to last member of th sequence

for x is unworthy of love.
(9)

4,

if x is worthy of love, then x is

(x)

ure.
(10)
(8)

(1,

a

a

(3,

4,

7)

pleasure, then each member of the sequence for

x

itself) is unworthy of love, (repeated applications of

7

only pleasures are worthy of love, then nothing is worthy of

love.

(7,

(in-

9,

[conclusion over]

and CP 5-9)

3,

38

If

(11)

pleasures are worthy of love, then so is
something that is not

pleasure.

(10)

The first inference is in need of comment.

follows from (1) alone that there is

Notice first that it

sequence for each pleasure.

a

says that pleasures having sequences all
1

a

have finite ones.

So

(2)

(3)

fol-

(1)

is

ows.

believe that--(l

I

)

(2)

,

hence

not immediately obvious to all.

force upon inspection.

(

3

)

—

i

s

a

sound argument.

But apparent counter examples lose all

Certain sensory qualities happen to be spontane-

ously and powerfully pleasing.

This creates some temptation to say that

they themselves are pleasures, rather than items that are pleasurably
taken.

That is, it can seem that some gratifications are just cases of

having
but

I

a

one place sensory quality, not relations of subjects to states,

think that careful

phenomenological

are no "pure pleasure qualities."

scrutiny reveals that there

Instead, there are pleasing feelings.

With some effort or imagination it is possible to think of having those

very feelings while not taking pleasure in them.

(For example, suppose

they were known to be sure signs of one's imminent, ghastly demise.)
they need not be liked.

So

We say they are "pleasures" because we like our

having them, i.e., the feeling is the object of the pleasure-taking relation.

Perhaps (2) is debatable.

I

suppose that someone with divine cog-

nitive powers could take pleasures having infinite sequences, but it
seems best just to leave that consideration aside.

(We could

scrupu-

lously add the antecedent "If nothing has divine powers, then" to
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and the conclusion.)

(2)

out that

The best way

pleasure violating it would be not merely
"infinitely in-

a

volved," but also "infinitely

04,13

° 4 * 14

It

i

nvol uted"

£j. s infinitely involved

:

= df.

28

Necessarily, whoever thinks of

P

thinks of infinitely many states of affairs.

£

is

infinitely involuted

volved in

(3)

see to justify (2) is to point

I

p

=

df.

Each state of affairs in-

is infinitely involved.

seems to me that infinitely involuted states are
necessarily mind-

boggling.

So

I

accept (2), and endorse the argument from
(1) and (2) to

.

Premise (4) is taken straight from the text (from the second
cited
paragraph).
read

It

is

where the argument breaks down.

With effort, we can

(4) to say merely:

(4a)

(x)

if taking pleasure in x (i.e.,

"love" of x) is not of the

worthy sort, then pleasure taken in

x

is not worthy (i.e.,

"unworthy of love").
But of course hedonists can blithely and consistently accept the nearly

empty (4a).

(4a),

(1), and (5) do not

valid way to gain (11) from

( 1

)

- (4a

) .

imply (6), nor is there another
So

(4a)

is an inappropriate

readi ng.
On the other hand,

powerful

construal

it is not difficult to give (4) a sufficiently

to gain validly an anti-hedonistic conclusion.

First, though, we should be clear about what sort of conclusion we have.
Even

a

hedonist accepting Brentano's views about the relation of good-

ness of various sorts to being worthy of love need not dispute (11).
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After all, Brentano only claims that being
worthy of love is being
good

in the

"broadest" sense. 29

Hedonists can agree that things

other than pleasures are "broadly" speaking "good,"
whether that means
overall

good or the disjunction of intrinsic and
extrinsic goodness.

The most efficient way to turn this argument
into one addressed

straightforwardly against hedonism is to suppose that Brentano
meant to
appeal

to

a

special

sort of "love"

(call

it "i-love")

which is suited to

exactly the intrinsic goods, i.e., they are worthy of it,
and only they
are. 30
out.

Then we can suppose him to have been intending i-love throughNow to gain (6) we can turn to:

(4b)

if x is not worthy of i-love, then pleasure taken in x is

(x)

not worthy of i-love.

And now (11)
(12)

implies the distinctly anti-hedonistic:

If a
pi

pleasure is intrinsically good, then so is some non-

easure.

The implication of (12) by (1),
us pause and give it due reflection

.

(2)
.

and

(4b)

is interesting.

.

The trouble is that it is very hard to see why

one else, should accept (4b).
plies that all

(4b)

Let

is quite

a

a

hedonist, or any-

severe doctrine.

It

im-

pleasure in the intri nsical ly neutural--even when it is

known to be overall good--lacks intrinsic goodness.

taken in the discovery of

a

Yet a pleasure

wonder drug seems as good as any.

not plausible on its own, and Brentano does not defend it.

(4b)

is
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Does (4) have
logical

more credible reading which also has
sufficient

a

power for the argument at hand?

claim, not as trivial
(4c)

(x)

if x

as

is

Here is

a

fairly plausible

(4a):

intrinsically bad, then pleasure taken in

x is

not worthy of i-love.

Brentano has asserted that his epistemic test for
intrinsic value
vouches for (4c).

31

of course the hedonist should insist upon seeing

both that claim and the criterion verified, since the
denial of hedonism
is implied by (4c) together with the uncontroversi

(13)
It

al

:

Some pleasures have been taken in intrinsic evils.

clearly follows that not all pleasures are intrinsically good.

But

what is most important in the present context is that (4c) does not
support

a

valid inference to (11) via (1) and (2).

This can be readily

verified by noting that (1) and (2) only give us that some pleasure has
an object which is not

sically good.

a

pleasure, and thus, when (5) holds, not intrin-

That does not imply what is needed to make use of (4c)--

that each pleasure has an intrinsic evil as an object when (5) holds.
So even the rather dubious

(4c) is too weak for the argument.

Other readings of (4) can be tried.

None

I

have thought of accom-

plishes Brentano's purposes.
We can summarize the results of this section in this way:

Brentano can show that if pleasure is intrinsically good only when its
object is intrinsically good, then pleasures are not the only intrinsic
goods.

But the antecedent to that that statement needs defense and

seems indefensible.
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E»

C.

D.

Broad's Malice Objection

Broad's objection to hedonism is simple and
direct.

us to give careful

consideration to

a

certain sort of pleasure.

He

asks

He

thinks that reflection makes it obvious that this
sort of pleasure is
bad, not good:

Now consider the state of mind which is called 'malice.'

Suppose

I

perceive or think of the undeserved misfortune of another with
pleasure.

Is

the relational

it not

perfectly plain that any cognition which has

property of being cognition of another's undeserved

misfortune and the hedonic quality of pleasantness will be worse as
the pleasure is more intense?

No doubt malice is a state of mind

which on the whole tends to increase human misery.

clear that we do not regard it as evil merely as

a

But surely it is

means.

Even if

we were quite sure all malice would be impotent, it seems clear to

me we should condemn it as intrinsically bad. 32

The only way

I

know of utterly to quash and refute an objection is

to deduce a contradiction

from it using only the safest inference rules.

That cannot be done in this case.

In

fact,

I

"garden-variety" refutation is possible here.
tation.

I

think that not even
(I

mean plain old refu-

suppose "garden-variety" was once roughly co-extensive with

"average quality" among flowers or vegetables.
as to make the metaphor misleading.)

what is intuitively so.

It

is

so much better now

Indeed, Broad's is an appeal

to

That would seem to put it beyond all reasoned

critici sm--there is no disputing about taste, as they say (usually in
Latin).

I

suppose not.

But there are things that can be said against
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objections which are said to derive from
immediate intuition.
what is purported to be intuitive is
actually

a

Sometimes

badly drawn inference.

Perhaps the claim that it is intuitive that
one is not moving when

standing still on solid ground is

a

claims to be combatted with rational
I

good example of this.

force?

How are such

The best that can be done,

think, is to point to an intuitive truth which
is being confused with

the asserted intuition, and show that the assertion
is not justified by

that truth.

(In the motion

example, it can be observed that what one

knows is that one is not moving relative to what is
standardly presupposed as the velocity-determining frame of refernce--the
surface of the

earth.

That of course leaves open the question of motion in
relation to

other things.)

So our question here ought

that much in the case of the apparent evil
It

is a start

to suggest that we

to be:

Can the hedonist do

of malice?

focus only upon the value we find

in malice when it has no valuable consequences for good or ill.
will

help us attend to its intrinsic value.

That

But clearly Broad is aware

of the importance of ignoring consequences, and yet he means to draw our

attention to an intuition of negative value stemming from thought about
the malicious frame of mind itself.

And the hedonist should,

I

believe,

grant that there is such an intuition.
But states which may be the ones Broad

is counting

as cases of

malice are ones in which the hedonist can consistently find some evil.
Broad speaks of pleasurable "cognition of another's undeserved misfor-

tune."

Perhaps, then, he means such states as:

.

:

94

(x)

Robinson taking pleasure in what he knows
to be Smith's

un

deserved misfortune.

Hedonists are not even committed to (x) being
intrinsically good,
implies some pleasure for Robinson, which
they must count good.

(x)

But it

also implies misfortune, which hedonists
are logically free to count

intrinsically evil.

At

least intensities and durations must also
be

specified, before the hedonist is committed to an
intrinsic value status
for (x).
But more importantly, states such as (x), even
where all

param-

eters relevant for the version of hedonism are specified,
as in:
(x

1

)

Robinson taking pleasure for

2

seconds of

what he knwos to be Smith undergoing

2

2

units intensity in

seconds of

1

unit in-

tensity pain
must not be just assumed to count as good.

consistency rate

n

Again, the hedonist can with

pain-intensi ty-times-duration units twice as bad as

pleasure-intensi ty-t imes-duration units is good. 33

$0

only against

n

a

complete intrinsic value theory, of which, say, quantitative hedonism is
the "top half," can the intrinsic value of

a

state such as (x‘) be

tested
We should consider the other major sort of state which mght be
cal led

"mal ice"
(y)

Robinson taking pleasure at what he takes to be Smith's undeserved misfortune.

Even here, it would be consistent and not crazy for
(6) to

imply

a

certain evil

di

a

hedonist to hold

sjunction--Robi nson having

a

false belief
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or Smith experiencing misfortune.

That would not be part of an
espe-

cially plausible value theory; it is not
worth stressing.

Better for

the hedonist to observe that, since
it must be malice we consider,

a

po-

tentially misleading instance of believed evil
must be part of the state
considered.

If

we are inclined to believe that beliefs
tend to be true,

as most of us unrefl ect ively are, then
intuitions about what the state

gives evidence for may have

a

pernicious effect on our attempts to as-

sess its intrinsic value.

Another point the hedonist should make also concerns
the difficulty in attending to just the state itself, apart from
conditions ir-

relevant to its intrinsic value.

It

is hard,

impossible, to try for long to evaluate
to circumstances that make it true.

include much that

a

perhaps psychologically

state without giving thought

For (y), these would typically

hedonist can consistently condemn.

a

Where there is

malice, there is usually some painful episode prompting the attitude.
Also, the individual

who feels the malice typically has qualms and mis-

givings about adopting such

a

feeling.

Additionally, despair and des-

peration tend to be among the attitudes formed by the one who feels

malice.

Failing to feel well themselves, they attempt consolation by

considering cases that appear to advance their relative status.

And

lastly, the malicious are typically also displeased by the other's good

fortune, especially during the immediate temporal

malice.

vicinity of feeling

Now none of these pains is implied by (y) and its ilk.

repeat, there is

a

very strong tendency to consider (y) against

ground of facts, and these things are part of the normal

But to
a

back-

setting of
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cases of malice.

And they do, it seems to me,
provide a credible origin

for some of what enters into
our negative evaluation of
malice.

tend to be part of something
sordid.

determine (y)'s intrinsic value.

does

It

Yet none of these things
helps to

(These accompaniments also help
to

explain away Broad's view that malice
gets intrinsically worse as the
pleasure gets more intense.
For these associated evils do
tend to be
worse as the pleasure increases.)
Hedonists can note that malice is evidence
for another sort of

negative quality--bad character.
ing a bad character, a bad

count it so.

If

Perhaps the existence of

person, is intrinsically bad.

they do, (y) is in another way

a

a

person hav-

Hedonists can

mixed state--the

pleasure is intrinsically good, but it tends
to confirm the presence of
an intrinsic evil.

So

there is also that way in which we can be misled

when evaluating it.

Hedonists need not explain all evaluations in terms
of what they
say is intrinsically good or bad, though.

This is obvious in the case

of most good-of-a-ki nd ratings--good cutlery, good
thievery, etc.

perhaps less clear in the case of good personhood, but

I

It

is

do not see why

even the utilitarian hedonist must equate person evaluations with
having

such-and-such

a

relation to states with such-and-such intrinsic values.

This would be

a

plausible requirement if being

a

good person implied

some close connection to performing morally right acts.

plication seems to withstand scrutiny, however.

So

I

No such

im-

believe that even

the utilitarian hedonist can consistently maintain that there is an
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intuition about badness of
character prompted by
not

(y)

and the like, while

founding that upon intrinsic
values.

There are two final distinctions
which hedonists of every persuasion can take note of.
It tends to be displeasing
to think about cases
of malice.
And perhaps displeasure under
the right conditions is evidence of intrinsic evil, or at least
evidence against intrinsic goodness. 34

But the displeasure could be giving
evidence for the evil

some of the above mentioned associated
states and persons.
(y)

of

After all,

does involve someone suffering undeserved
misfortune, even though it

does not imply that.

And further, that very displeasure
may be the

source of the intuition that the malice is
intrinsically bad.
Those seem to me to be the principal

points that any hedonist can

make which tend to undermine Broad's objection.

Do states

intrinsically bad on intuitive grounds after

these factors have been

properly discounted?

all

like (y) seem

think it quite doubtful that they do.

I

The ob-

jection is not decisive.

F.

G.

E.

Moore's Beauty Objection

Moore tries to persuade us that beauty

(a

beautiful

state of

affairs, we would say) has intrinsic goodness:
Let us

tiful

imagine one world exceedingly beautiful.
as you can; put

admire--mountai ns
moon.

,

Imagine it as beau-

into it whatever on this earth you most

rivers, the sea; trees and sunsets, stars and

Imagine all these combined in exquisite proportions, so that

no one jars

against the other, but each contributes to increase the

98

beauty of the whole.
possibly conceive.

And then imagine the ugliest
world you can

Imagine it simply one heap of
filth, containing

whatever is more disgusting to us for
whatever reason, and the whole
as far as it may be without one
redeeming feature.

...

The one

thing we are not entitled to imagine
is that any human being ever
has, or ever by any possibility can

.

.

.

see and enjoy the beauty

of the one or hate the foulness of the
other.
ing them quite apart

Well, even so suppos-

from any possible contemplation by any
human

being; still, is it irrational

to hold that it is better that the

beautiful world should exist than the one which
is ugly?35
These remarks were in fact directed against
Sidgwick's view of
what it would be rational

to aim to produce.

But it is clear that the

beautiful world is to be intri nsical ly better.

tween

a

beautiful

Also, the comparison be-

and an aesthetically (and otherwise) neutral

world is

better for our interests, since hedonists can attribute disvalue
of various sorts to ugliness.

Again,

I

think the most that can be done in rational

opposition to

the case is to point out potentially misleading facets of the example.
The main thing to draw attention to is an effect of that fact that we

are actually contemplating the appearances of the pretty and neutral

worlds when we assess them.
than the latter.

It

is more pleasing to think of the former

The power of this to distract us

from the intrinsic

evaluation of them can be easily underestimated.
An analogy might help.

Think of the occasion on which you were

told the most amusing anecdote that you have heard lately.

Now imagine
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a

world in which loosely speaking
nothing exists except

a

perfect simu-

lation of the visual and auditory
features of the story-teller by
an unlikely sequence of aggregations
of randomly fluctuating
atoras-no conscious life is in that world.
Compare it to a world that is
so to speak
a complete blank-an empty
void.
It is quite difficult
not to like the
former better, and this makes it
remarkably tempting to say that it
is a

better place.

But here, sober further reflection
enables us to decline

to reach the conclusion that the
exemplification of the perceptual

ities of humorous anecdote recitation is
good in itself.

qual-

We realize

that we are amused to think of the place,
and that it contains an occurrence that powerful tends to provoke
enjoyment, but that exhausts its
value.
I

believe that the same realization is available in
the case of

the beautiful and neutral worlds.

At least it

seems that at this point

the champion of Moore's objection should say more
if it is to persuade
us.

do.

I

do not know what Moore would do, nor do

I

know what more would

83
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APPENDIX
INSTRUMENTAL VALUE WITHOUT INTRINSIC VALUE?
There has been

a

surprising controvery among axiologists.

The

disputed question is whether something might
be instrumental ly valuable
while nothing is

i

ntri nsical ly valuable.

It

is surprising that there

has been controversy about this because it
would seem to amount to the

question whether

worthless end.
Yet

Paul

a

It

thing could possess worth solely as

denied that instrumental

2

a

and Gilbert Harman 3 have

,

goodness implies intrinsic goodness.

Baylis^ has affirmed the implication.
conflict of basic intuitions here.

distinguished.

means to

seems obvious that the answer to that question is
no.

Taylor J Monroe Beardsley

resolve the issue.

a

I

Charles

believe that there is no

The purpose of this appendix is to

Various concepts of instrumental

value must be

When we bring each into sharp focus, we gain

answer to the question whether it implies intrinsic goodness.

a

clear
In

the

case of all but one of the concepts of interest, the implication fails.
For the one exception, an argument resembling the first cause argument

for God's existence establishes the implication.

A.

The Argument From Definition

Monroe Beardsley discusses an argument from definition for the
conclusion that instrumental value implies intrinsic value.

definition at stake
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Here is the
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D5.1

"x has instrumental! value"
means

"x

is conducive to some-

thing that has intrinsic value,"

where "conducive" is meant to cover
the relations of being
part and being

a

means.

5

a

necessary

Beardsley comments:

Obviously, if we accept [D5.1] we are as
committed to the existence
of intrinsic value as we are to the
existence of instrumental
val

ue.6

We can take this to be a way to affirm
the relevant implication:

P5.1

Necessarily, if something has instrumental!
value, then
something

i

ntri nsical ly good occurs.

7

Clearly, D5.1 guarantees the truth of P5.1.

So clear is this,

in

fact, that to the best of my knowledge D5.1 has never
been disputed by
any philosopher.

If D5.1

gave the concept of instrumental

sue, there would be no issue.

icant concept of instrumental

alysis of "good as
not correct.

a

means. "8

value at is-

D5.1 has been thought to define

value.
I

G.

E.

a

signif-

Moore proposed it as an an-

think it can be shown that that is

D5.1 misses the concept with which Moore was concerned

there, and that concept does raise

a

non-trivial question about whether

there is an implication from instrumental to intrinsic value.

To see

that the analysis fails, notice that something might have intrinsic
value and extrinsic disvalue in such proportion as to be neutral
tal

value.

If an event is

conducive to something like that and to noth-

ing else of any sort of value, then it satisfies Dl.

familiar or helpful

in to-

sense in which it is then "good as

But there is no
a

means," or "of
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instrumental

value."

terest.

proof by definition does not advance
the issue.

Its

In

So P5.1 uses a technical

effect, Beardsley too denies the
significance of P5.1.

serves that in the case of instrumental

...

concept of no clear in-

He ob-

value

it does not matter whether the value
[of the thing that con-

fers value upon its instrument] is intrinsic
or instrumental. 9
He maintains that the following definition
"should be acceptable":

D5.2

"x has

instrumental value" means

"x is conducive to

some-

thing that has value."

Charles Baylis has proposed the result of replacing "that
has value" in

which D5.2 with
good. 10

good

as his explanation of being

i

nstrumental ly

Neither philosopher specifies what sort of "value" or "good-

ness" is meant.

(We might find

in the

comments by Beardsley that were

just cited the suggestion that he intended the concept of having either

intrinsic or instrumental

value.

But that would render D5.2 circular.

And the consideration just raised against D5.1 would show that D5.2 also

gave

a

concept weaker than any intuitive notion of instrumental

value.)

Our complaint against D5.1 suggests that the right concept to use is

what we call being "good on the whole" or "overall good."

Roughly

speaking, that is the concept of making ethically significant contributions that are positive on balance.
it

In

the case of that notion, plainly

"does not matter" whether the impact is positive because of intrinsic

or instrumental

factors.

Also,

I

believe that it is what is usually in-

tended when something is called "good" or "valuable," where that is not
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short for

good such-and-such."

a

So we construe Beardsley and
Baylis

to be proposing:

05.3

"x has instrumental

thing overall

3

value" means "x is conducive to some-

good."

D5.3 captures what it is to be of some
good as

a

means.

And it allows

the formulation of the non-trivial:

P5.3

Necessarily, if something has instrumental value,
then
something intrinsically good occurs.

The argument from definition in this case clearly
fails.

cannot be derived from D5.3 by logic alone.

B.

P5.3

But is it true?

Beardsley, Taylor, and Harman on
First Cause Arguments

P5.3 has been taken to be susceptible to another sort of
proof.

The overall

goodness of

a

thing is entirely composed of the goodness it

has on its own and the goodness it gains from contingent relations to

other things.
attractive.

That makes something like the first cause argument look
It

is tempting to think that something could have instru-

mental

3

value only if somewhere along the line of things to which it

bears

a

causal

or part-to-whole connection is something that is overall

good by virtue of having value on its own, i.e., intrinsic goodness.

Here is Beardsley's sketch of such an argument:
1

Instrumental ly valuable'

is a relational

concept--x borrows its

value from y or y confers its value upon x.
is

If

the value y confers

itself instrumental, so that it is merely passed along from z.
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where does

z

gets its value?

In

the last analysis, something must

possess value in itself, or nothing can
get any value.

11

This seems to be the reasoning that
Baylis relies on when he asserts that instrumental

value does require intrinsic value. 12

Beardsley's objection to this version of the
argument is somewhat obscure.

He says that it cannot be a "pure formal

demonstration," since in

view of the failure of the argument from definition
it is not self-

contradictory to assert the existence of instrumental
value and deny the
existence of intrinsic value. 13
supposed to be.

Apparently,

a

it

clear what the problem is

is not

difficulty is to be brought about by the

fact that definition alone does not suffice to prove P5.3.

But even in

the argument's present rather metaphorical rendering, there
is no sug-

gestion that definition does all the work.

Nearly enough, it proceeds

by moving from the claim that gaining value

i

logical

nstrumental ly has the same

structure as borrowing to the conclusion that such gain requires

"owned" value, i.e., intrinsic goodness.

These may be

a

priori obvious

truths even if they do not follow directly from definitions.

That seems

to be the status of the proposition that red is a color,

for example.

So there does not seem to be a decisive objection here.

We shall

return

to this argument below, 14 when we are better equipped to evaluate it.

Beardsley offers

a

revised version, aimed at avoiding his objec-

tion:

Premise

1

We know, or have good reason to believe, that some things

are instrumental ly valuable.
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Premise

2

We could not know this unless we
knew some things to be

intrinsically valuable.
[Thus,] We know some things to be
intrinsically valuable. 15
Since knowledge of instrumental

value may depend upon knowledge of in-

trinsic value even if there is no existential
dependence, this argument
offers no direct support for P5.3.

But we should consider Beardsley's

objection to it, for it serves to bring to our
attention an important
kind of instrumental

takes to be

a

value.

He objects to Premise 2 by offering what
he

case of knowledge of instrumental

of intrinsic value.

value without knowledge

The example is that of good health.

It

is claimed

that we see it to "retain its eligibility" as an
instrumental

witnessing

a

variety of

si

good by

tuations--seei ng that where present it did not

"interfere with our pursuits," and where absent it "contributed to
the
rise of difficult problems and limited our capacity to solve
them.

"I 6

We should agree that these things can be learned without evidence
for the presence of any intrinsic good.

instrumental

that the sense of

value" at stake is given by D5.3 (our reading of

Beardsley's wording in D5.2).
not

But recall

The mentioned features of good health do

give knowledge that it is conducive to an overall good.

Knowing

that requires evidence that freedom to pursue our pursuits or freedom
from difficult problems is, or conduces to, an overall good.

We need to

be shown that those freedoms could be seen to be of positive overall

worth without evidence about intrinsic goods.

Beardsley does not give

a

And that is not done.

clear case of knowledge of

i

nstrumental 3

value in the absence of knowledge of intrinsic value here.

So

4
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There is

a

familiar notion of instrumental

value that is readily

seen to be exemplified by good
health because of the features
indicated
in the example.
D 5.4

"x has

We can bring out that notion in

rough way with:

a

instrumental value" means "events consisting

in

instantiations of x sufficiently often make
causal contributions to gaining something that is sought."^
This is the concept of being

a

generally effective means to some end,

whether or not the end has any sort of value.
concerned with just this kind of instrumental

Beardsley

s

objection to Premise

were the one at stake.

7

2

Certainly we are often
value.

It

would be successful

is clear that

if this concept

For it applies to good health because of just

the sort of feature noted-utility in the long run.

And plainly we can

be justified in believing good health to have instrumental
4 value

while we have no evidence about intrinsic goods.

So

perhaps this was

what Beardsley was thinking of when he proposed the objection,
rather
than instrumental value.
We should also note that properties can have instrumental

value while no intrinsic good obtains.

For example, there are the

gloomy possible situations where events which consist in instantiating
the property of consulting an authority on painless suicide usually gain

people something they seek in conditions entirely unrelieved by intrinsic goods.

So it

is

plain that we have no instrumental

value implication in the case of this concept.

to

intrinsic

:
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P5.3 is not refuted by such
examples, however.

We have yet to see

anything that undermines the intuition
that instrumental value must

ultimately derive from intrinsic value.
Taylor and Gilbert Harman have also attacked
first cause ar-

Paul

guments for the sort of implication in question.

A careful

of their work brings out new concepts of
instrumental

value.

examination
Taylor

writes
[T]here is nothing inconsistent in supposing

...

a

world where all

values [are] extrinsic, the value of one thing
depending upon the
value of another whose value in turn depends on the
value of some-

thing else, ad infinitum
The sort of

.

.

.18

extrinsic" value which Taylor calls "instrumental goodness"

is given this characterization:
.

.

.

creation, furtherance, strengthening, or increase of something

intrinsically or extri nsical ly good, or destruction, hinderance,
avoidance, weakening or decrease of something intrinsically disval uable

J9

The same considerations that showed fault in D5.1 show that this

account is too weak to identify any familiar concept.

An event might

"further" an intrinsic good which is extri nsical ly so bad as to be neutral

in overall

is sufficient

value.

for having

There is no intuitive sense in which doing that
"i

appealing to overall value.
cial, we get:

nstrumental

value."

Again, we do better by

Simplifying while retaining what is cru-

Ill

D5.5

"x has

1

instrumental

5

value" means "x causally contributes
to

bringing about something overall

good or preventing something

overall bad."

D5.5 does seem to give us

a

concept of interest.

is clear that we

It

sometimes take things to have instrumental
merit because of what they
prevent as well as what they accomplish.

The implication in question,

then, is:
P5.5

Necessarily, if something has

i

nstrumental

5

value, then

something intrinsically good occurs.

Taylor tries to describe
In

such

a

a

world that shows P5.5 to be false:

world, things would be judged as good solely as means
to

ends which were to be good solely as parts of wholes
which were to
be judged to be good solely as means to ends and
so on indefinitely,

...

No one would do anything for its own sake,

found personal
people'

enjoyment in it.

It

would be

a

simply because he

world of 'practical

who know how to get things done but had no reason for get-

ting one thing done rather than another.20

Since Taylor holds that only "personal enjoyments" can be intrinsically
good, 21 there would be nothing in these worlds that he counts as in-

trinsically good (assuming that there are no personal enjoyments, and
not merely that no one does anything for the sake of them).

should we say that these worlds include instrumental

5

goods?

But why
It

must

be because the things judged good are only judged good as means and
parts.

Yet of course that fact

alone should not persuade us.

We need

to see that occurrences in such worlds actually further goods or hinder
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evils, not merely that they are judged
to do so.

Taylor does not indi-

cate how we might see this.
We need not follow Taylor by objecting
to P5.5 on the ground that
an endless sequence of instrumental

goods is possible.

For an event can

get instrumental value by just keeping
something overall bad from

coming to pass.
tion of

a

For example, an inoculation that prevents
the acquisi-

dreadful disease presumably has

i

nstrumental

value.

5

might occur in the unfortunate absence of any
intrinsic good.

provides us with another reading of "instrumental

value"

This
So D5.5

in which

it is

simple to see that this predicate might apply where
nothing is intrin-

sically good.

But we should not forget that we are still without
any

disproof of P5.3.
Like Taylor and Beardsley, Gilbert Harman denies the inconsisten-

...

cy of

the notion of an infinite series

A,

B,

C,

of which is desirable only because the next one is. "22

etc. each member

Harman tries

to locate the plausibility and the defect in first cause arguments

against such series, and he gives us yet another sense of

"

instrumental

val ue."

The crucial

notion in his reconstruction of the argument is that

of basic instrinsic value.

A "basic intrinsic value function" as Harman

defines it is any such that the intrinsic value of
all

a

thing is the sum of

the results of applying the function to each entailment of the

thing; and such that the total

value of

a

thing, x, is the sum of all

the results of applying the function to each thing, y, times the degree
to which y is probable on x.23

Here is the first cause argument

c
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Hannan constructs: 24

If there is a basic

then nothing has psitive overall

intrinsic value function,

value unless the result of applying
the

function something--the "basic intrinsic
value" of the
tive number.

t h i ng - -

i

s

a

posi-

That is clearly true since unless the
function yields

a

positive number somewhere, each overall value
will be the sum of the results of multiplying various degrees of probability
times the basic in-

trinsic value zero.

So,

if there is a basic

intrinsic value function,

then:
P5.h

Necesarily, if something is overall good, then something
has
positive basic intrinsic value.

Harman's objection to his first cause argument consists in
ques-

tioning whether there is

a

basic intrinsic value function. 25

without finding out whether there does exist such

a

But

function, we can as-

certain that this argument does not prove the sort of implication in

question here.
value to basi

Notice that P5.h states an implication from overall

intrinsic goodness.

P5.3, since if something has

something is overall good.

i

There is an important link with

nstrumental

But if there

3
j_s

value, then by definition
a

basic intrinsic value

function, then it is clearly possible for there to be something with in-

strumental value while
there is

a

no intrinsic good simpliciter obtains.

basic intrinsic value function, the overal

ample, administering

a

1

For if

value of, for ex-

medicine will be positive if it increases the

probability of some intrinsic good such as the patient experiencing the
joy of recovery.

This positive value does not depend upon the joy actu-

ally being felt.

The existence of

a

basic intrinsic value function

s
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requires the possibility of overall
goods occurring where nothing intrinsically good happens.
In those situations, events
conducing to such
overall

goods would have instrumental

sic goods.

3

value in the absence of intrin-

Thus no argument which relies upon
the existence of

a

basic

intrinsic value function can help to establish
that instrumental
value necessitates intrinsic goodness, as P5.3
asserts.

This manner of acquiring overall goodness
brings us to another

concept of instrumental
D5.6

"x has

i

value:

nstrumental

5

value" means "there is something which

would be overall

good if it were to occur and such that its

probability on

is

x

greater than its absolute probabil-

ity." 26
The correspondi ng implication principle is:

P5.6

Necessarily, if something has instrumental value, then some

intrinsically good occurs.
D5.6 does not seem to me to provide us with any familiar notion of

instrumental

value.

In

effect Harman contends that it does:

[W]e must say that S is desirable because of what it is likely to
lead to.

S

quences.

For example, your giving me ten dollars will

may happen in various ways having different consehave varying

consequences depending on whether you give me the money as
to

hold for purposes of

a

bet, or to give to someone else.

a

gift,

...

being desirable because of what it would lead to must be taken as
special

case of S's being desirable because of what it would make

more likely.

2?

S'

a
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These considerations are not convincing.

Even if your giving me ten

dollars is very likely to have beneficial
consequences, if the unfortunate fact is that it would have only
grave results

which it is "desirable" or has "instrumental
see it, instrumental

I

i

s

made

1

In

i

I

see no sense in

value," as D5.6 has it.

As

value turns on only what would happen,
not what

kely.

any event, we should have no trouble assessing
P5.6.

If we add

to our most recent example that the patient's
joy of recovery would be

overall good, then the admi
tal 6 value,

ni

stration of the likely cure has instrumen-

since it raises the probability of something that would
be

overall good.

This is so even if the patient fails to recover.

trinsic good has been implied to obtain.
cept of instrumental

No

in-

So once again the precise con-

value in question is one concerning which it ought

to be uncontroversial

that intrinsic goodness is not implied.

We have seen that when Beardsley, Taylor and Herman criticize

first cause argumentation for the sort of implication that we are consi-

dering they address themselves to notions of instrumental

clearly do not require intrinsic goodness.
son to doubt P5.3 or

a

value which

But we have yet to find rea-

genuine problem in the first cause argument for

it that Beardsley formulates.

C.

A First Cause Argument Refuted

Can we disprove P5.3 directly?
as easy to become overall

that

a

A refutation is at hand,

good as Hannan's work sugests.

thing can become overall

if it is

For suppose

good by just making some would-be
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overall good more probable.

Then an event can be conducive
to such a

probability-raising overall good-thereby
acquiring instrumental

value-while nothing intrinsically good
actually occurs.
it.

But many will

all

good so easily.

That would do

find it doubtful that an event
might come to be over-

They will

take it as intuitively clear
that

thing

a

must be actually, rather than just
probably, beneficial to be actually
good.

That is plausible.

Other considerations show P5.3 to
be false,

however.
P5.3 is about instrumental
3 value.

That is gained whenever an

event results in something that has
ethical
on balance.
an ethical

So

all

we need to refute P5.3 is something which
counts as

benefit without introducing any intrinsic
good.

be good is to prevent evil.
was

a

influence which is positive

The Dutch boy's act of plugging the dike

valuable deed even if no intrinsic good came of it.

ficial

simply because it kept

One way to

a

It

was bene-

catastrophe from coming to pass.

other way to be beneficial is to make an improvement.

An-

Assuming the pain

of disease to be an intrinsic evil, treatment that causes
the pain to

abate is valuable for doing that.

There need not be any intrinsic good

added to the situation for the treatment to be overall good.
ution or removal
evil --the evil

ment.)

of evil

suffices.

The dimin-

(Perhaps this too is preventing

that would still be there if it were not for the improve-

Intuitively, the idea is that it is equally creditable to move

the world upward some amount on the overall

value scale from what would

have been, whether or not the change introduces something better than
neutral

.
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The impact of these observations
on P5.3 is clear.

Possible si-

tuations exist in which evil is prevented
or improvement is made, though
no intrinsic good ever occurs.

By being

conducive to such prevention or

improvement, events gain instrumental value in
the absence of intrinsic goods.
We

P5.3 is false.

ai

e

now in

a

position to assess the original

which was sketched by Beardsley.

Recall

argument for P5.3

that the argument moves from

the assumption that instrumental value amounts
to "borrowed" value to

the conclusion that it implies some "possessor" of
value--some intrinsic
good.

It

is

now plain that this borrowing metaphor is not apt.

event can have

a

An

valuable result, and thereby have instrumental

value, without taking out any "loan" from the intrinsic
goodness of an-

other thing.
better.

It

is enough to keep evil

Of course this does not imply that an endless sequence of value

dependents is possible.
to have

from obtaining or to make things

i

nstrumental

3

Rather, it shows that no such series is needed

value without intrinsic goodness.

A First Cause Argument Upheld

D.

This refutation of P5.3 and the first cause argument for it may

seem unsatisfactory.

diminishing evil

There remains an intuition that merely removing or

is not

good enough to be "truly" instrumental ly good.

What it real ly takes, it might be contended, is contributing something
that is "positively worthwhile."

I

believe that there is

made here, but it is not properly construed as

objection to P5.3.

a

a

point to be

complaint against the

Instead we should say that we have another concept
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of goodness which is more stringent
than that of being meritorious
on

balance-what we have called "overall goodness."
concept is that of being intrinsically
good.
looking for.

That cannot be what we are

D5.1 gives the most strai ghtforward
instrumental connec-

tion to an intrinsic good.
weak and in

Of course one narrower

a

And we have seen that it is in

way too strong.

It

a

way too

too weak in that contributing to

is

something merely intrinsically good is insufficient
to insure having any

intuitive sort of positive value, and too strong
in that it does not

matter for instrumental value whether the contributed
good
intrinsic or instrumental
to overall

goodness.

best if it were
fail

a

factors.

Those reflections lead us to appeal

Now we are seeking something better.

would be

It

concept which does not manifestly either imply, or

imply, intrinsic goodness.

to

is made so by

Such

a

notion of instrumental

value

might be at the root of controversy about the implication.
A concept that has the qualities we want can be identified as fol-

lows.

First, let us assume for the sake of simplicity that the contin-

gent relation by which an event may acquire instrumental

value is causal

contribution, and that cases of improvement that go from bad to lessthan-good can all be counted as cases of prevention.

Here is

a

prelim-

inary (inductive) definition:
D5.7

"q

is a causal

tributes to

The causal
causal

successor to

q or a causal

successors to

p,

chains going through

p"

means "either

successor

p

p

causally con-

causally contributes to

then, are just all the things in all the
p

that come after

p.

Now we identify

a

:
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restricted sort of overall goodness, one where
prevention does not
count
D5.8

"p is positively worthwhile" means "the
overall

value of

positive even after the prevention-induced value
of
causal

is

and p's

successors has been discounted."

The notion is roughly that of being overall
ing

p

p

good either in virtue of be-

intrinsically good or in virtue of causally contributing
to overall

goods, where the caused goods themselves are taken to have
value in only

those two ways.
D5.9

x

has

Now for our final
i

nstrumental

g

concept of instrumental

value:

value" means "x causally contributes to

something positively worthwhile."
Here is our final

P5.9

implication principle:

Necessarily, if something has

i

nstrumental g value, then

something intrinsically good occurs.

Loosely speaking, D5.9 identifies the concept of being
provement that goes beyond the neutral

intuitions about instrumental

point.

It

a

means to an im-

seems to conform to

value that might be the basis for

a

lin-

gering admiration for P5.3.

Perhaps, therefore, that is really mis-

placed admiration for P5.9.

Yet it is not just obvious that P5.9 is

true.

After all, events can be positively worthwhile on purely causal

grounds.

Why could not there be an endless sequence of such events,

never tied down to any intrinsic good?

Considerations are available that show P5.9 to be worthy of belief.

In

outline, the reasoning goes as follows.

We consider the total

reservoir of positive value that can be got by causal

contribution in
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each possible world.

We argue that where the consequent
of P5.9 is

false, this repository of value is at best
neutral.

world can P5

5
.

'

s

Thus in no such

antecedent be true.

Now for the details.

We start by identifying

a

world's total

stock of positive worth:
The conjunction of valuable effects in w (CVEw")

=

the con-

junction of every event occurring in w which is positively
worthwhile and to which something causally contributes.
The CVE for

tal

a

world, w, might be called "the first cause of instrumen-

value in w," since each event of

to cause

a

conjunct of CVEw.

i

nstrumentalg value in w helps

Now we consider an arbitrary world, wl,

where nothing intrinsically good occurs.
(T)

The

i

nstrumental

g

A thesis:

value of every event in wl is no higher

than the positive value of CVEwl.
(T)

go

is entirely credible.

As just noted, an event

in wl has nowhere to

for instrumental 9 value but to some conjunct of CVEwl.

junction, CVEwl summarizes the value of all its conjuncts.

As a conSo the

posi-

tive worth of CVEwl is the highest that can be gained by causal contri-

bution in wl.

Thus, to assess P5.5 we should ask:

possible value for CVEwl?

Well,

trinsic goodness or causal

contribution.

What is the highest

positive worth is achieved only by inBy hypothesis, there are no

intrinsic goods in wl, and so none conjoined in the CVEwl.

If

the CVEwl

has any positively worthwhile effects of its own, then by definition

they are among its conjuncts. 28
a

And in general, the positive value of

conjunction is determined in part by what its conjuncts help to cause.
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Can CVEwl be better than
neutral

contributions?

No.

because of its conjuncts'
causal

Any conjunct that causes
something positively

worthwhile causes something which
is itself
definition of “CVEw."
tive worth that

a

The vital

a

conjunct of CVEwl, by

consequence of this is that any
posi-

conjunct has in virtue of what it
brings about has its

appropriate influence on the value of CVEwl
only if
the

c ause

s

it

is not counted in

contribution to the value of the conjunction
CVEwl, but

rather counted as the contribution of the
effect alone.

To see this

clearly, consider the simple case of the
conjunction of an intrinsically
neutral cause with its sole valuable effect.

It

is

plain that the whole

positive value those conjuncts add to that
conjunction is the worth con-

tributed by the effect.

would be

It

derived value of the cause.

a

mistake also to add the causally

But now notice that the same goes for each

conjunct in the CVEwl--its role in determining the
positive value of the
CVEwl is properly taken into account only if any worth
it gets by being
a

cause is ignored, since that worth is fully represented
by the contri-

bution its effect makes as

a

conjunct.

Only value as

a

cause and in-

trinsic value might give positive worth to these effects.

Thus just

their intrinsic value is counted toward the positive worth of the CVEwl,
and by the assumption that wl contains no intrinsic good we know that

value to be zero at best.
That exhausts the ways that CVEwl might have come to be positively

worthwhile.

All

have been seen to fail.

(T)

enables us to infer from

this that nothing has instrumental value in wl.

Since wl is merely

an arbitrarily chosen world in which nothing intrinsically good occurs,
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it follows that

i

instrumental

g

value necessitates intrinsic goodness,

i.e., that P5.9 is true.

We have now examined the full

strumental

value.

range of prevalent concepts of in-

Most of them are readily shown not to imply
intrin-

sic goodness, but we have just seen that one
concept this question

brings to mind does have that implication.

Thus we have the congenial

result that each side in the dispute can be construed
to have

tion in fact.

a

founda-

Reflection seems to verify that every consideration for

or against the sort of implication at stake in fact pertains
to one or

another of the notions discussed above.

If

so, and

if the above reason

ing has been successful, then the controversy has been resolved.

,
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Notes to Appendix

T yl

26*

Hall, 1961)

- ormd1

D1

course (Englewood Cliffs:
ValUe

e t

a

cf Philoscp h v 64
4 Charles
p.

490.
5

Prentice-

p

T

M^n''

r

,

a

°f

^ll°sophy

^eno-

and

Intr1 " SiC Value

>"

^"ii

Baylis, "Grading, Values and Choice," Mind
67 (1958),

Beardsley, op. cit.,

8 Ibid.

r

s nn

’"

p.

p.

4.

5.

^For the sake of uniformity and definiteness we shall
assume
here that the bearers of instrumental and intrinsic
value are things
that occur--events.
(One exception is required to accommodate a citation.
See below, section B, and note 17.)
Since the typical instrumental relation is causation, this is the most natural
assumption.
8 G.

E. Moore, Principia Ethica (London:
Cambridge University
Press, 1903), p. 21.
It should be made clear at this point that our
topic concerns concepts of having instrumental value, not concepts of
being nstrument al ly good.
The distinction is that the former are concepts of being of some good from the instrumental point of view, the
latter are concepts of making instrumental contributions that are on
an ce good.
Moore is not explicit about which variety he is after
with his account of "good as a means," but brief consideration of it
shows that it is not at all suited to identifying a concept of the latter sort.
D5.1 just looks at one contribution of value, not the onbalance value of all contributions.
(I argue just below that D5.1 does
not even suffice to say what it is to be of some good as a means.)
i

We will

be concerned below with concepts of having some positive
instrumental value of some sort.
As in the case of Moore, philosophers
who have done previous work on the topic are best interpreted to be appealing to those concepts.
And more importantly, there is no consideration that distinguishes the plausibility of a some-good-i nstrumental ly
to intrinsic good implication from that of its nearest on-balance-goodinstrumental ly to intrinsic good counterpart.
So this difference does
not affect the issue.

^Beardsley, op. cit.,

p.

l^Bayli s, op.

490.

it.

p.

5.

.
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n Beardsley,

op. cit., p.

6.

12 Baylis, op.
cit., pp. 488, 490.
13 Beardsley, op.
cit., p.

7.

14 See section
C below.

15 Beardsley,
16 Ibid.,

p.

op. cit., p.

7.

8.

17MGood he alth" seems to refer to a property, not
an event.
D5.4 is intended to express the simplest intuitive
instrumental link
between such a property and a goal
.

18 Taylor, op. cit.,
p.
19 Ibid.,

p.

28.

2G Ibid.

,

p.

32.

,

p.

23.

21 Ibid

.

26.

22 Harman, op.
cit., p. 800.

23 Ibid., p. 801.

^Harman is interested in an argument for the conclusion that
something is intrinsically good.
Since we are concerned with whether
instrumental value of various sorts implies intrinsic goodness, Harman's
arugment has been adjusted to conclude with P5.4— the conditional that
comes closest to what we seek.
25 Hanrian, op. cit.,
pp. 800-804.

28 Ibid.,

Harman does not formulate D5.6, but some
pp. 796-798.
such concept is clearly suggested ther.
27 ibid.

,

p.

797.

28jhe principle that nothing can cause one of its own conjuncts
If it is true, then CVEwl can have no posiis intuitively attractive.
The important thing here is that whether
tively worthwhile effects.
this principle is true or not, only the CVEwl's conjuncts might give it
causally derived worth.

e
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